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ALBANIA

Demographic Change, Communications Bring Hints of Perestroyka

90EB0109A Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 20 Oct 89 p 7

[Article by Dietrich Schlegel: "Careful Openness in Albania. Pressure Towards the West"]

[Text] Albania is stirring. Young Albanians, especially students and academicians, are absolutely consumed with curiosity; they want to know more about what is going on on the other side of the border; they study foreign languages by all possible means, including by teaching themselves and by listening to foreign radio stations—also in the hope of getting out to the West some day.

The young Albanians love and know all current pop and rock music, including heavy metal. Cassettes are circulating in large numbers and Italian radio, easily picked up throughout the country and free from any obstruction, contribute their part. Even functionaries, making fun of themselves openly and in a cunning-likable way, praise the Italian TV—which can be seen clearly everywhere in the country—as a popular medium for political information in order to prove that Albania is anything but an isolated country.

However, is Albanian political leadership, the Workers' Party, stirring as well? To answer this question, it should be remembered that in no Communist European country did the population legitimize almost unanimously the power of the party as much as in Albania. The reason for this congruence is that it was the Communists who won Albania's independence and protected it for 45 years, and that they were the ones who were able to give the population—compared with the stark underdevelopment in the pre-World War II era—prosperity and social safety.

However, more than half of all Albanians are now less than 30 years old, and—considering their 2.2-percent population growth, the highest in Europe—the proportion of young people will continue to grow. Still, the young generation no longer remembers liberation and reconstruction from their own experience. They are comparing themselves with countries abroad and are asking questions.

The enthusiasm, with which the Albanian youth met the most recent—extremely well organized by the Goethe Institute—first Cultural Week of the FRG in Albania was impressive and—compared with the book exhibition—almost overwhelming.

The party leaders have recognized that they must take account of the thirst for knowledge and the special interests of the young generation. It so happened that, at about the same time the Cultural Week was held, Ramiz Alia, first secretary of the Workers' Party CC [central committee] and successor to Enver Hoxha, demanded in a policy speech before the Eighth CC plenary that the needs of the youth with respect to education, the arts and literature (more translations of well-known authors in world literature), sports and entertainment be met to a larger degree.

Nevertheless, in the same speech, Ramiz Alia expressed his inflexible views against perestroyka, the "revisionist betrayal" by Gorbachev and his "accomplices" in the USSR and such other "formerly" socialist countries as Poland and Hungary. Communism did not fail them, he said, rather the crises in these countries are the result of their denying Marxism-Leninism and replacing it with bourgeois ideology.

To prevent potential deviations from the pure doctrine and to discourage certain Western hopes, Ramiz Alia underlined his rejection of any "deformation of socialism": Never would a weakening of the socialist property be permitted nor a return to private property and capital exploitation; never would the dictatorship of the proletariat, nor the party's leading role in favor of the so-called pluralism "the bourgeoisie is offering us," be curtailed.

How can these aggressive statements be reconciled with the impression that Albania is stirring? An answer is already provided by the thematization of the ideological challenge itself, based on the recognition that information on East European reforms or on the West European integration process does not halt at the Albanian border. In the long run, Albania cannot close her eyes to this global movement, unless she wants to fall back into isolation. However, the nation's leadership would like to carefully push ahead with the opening without letting this development get out of control.

On the other hand, the Albanian Communists have almost always assigned equal importance to national interests and ideology, and national interests are tantamount to keeping Albania independent. This, for instance, was also demonstrated in her relationship with the FRG, which figures high on Albania's list in terms of intensification of foreign relations. At various opportunities, assurances had been given that the constitutional ban of foreign credits would be maintained. Albania would not repeat the mistakes made by such socialist countries as Hungary, Poland, and Romania which are, or were, heavily indebted to the West. There are other ways, he continued, to intensify foreign economic relations. Hence, no abrupt changes in Albany's course should be expected.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Deputies' Call for 'Policy of Action' Lauded
90EC0098A Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech
6 Oct 89 p 3

[Commentary by Ladislav Tuma: "Introduce a Policy of Action"]

[Text] The proceedings of the committees of the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council have had lately one striking characteristic in common: the deputies point out that it is not enough just to make a resolution concerning some problem. Deputy to the Federal Assembly F. Brabenec stated unequivocally in the committee for social policy: "It will be of no help to anything to adopt a nice resolution and then come to the conclusion a year later that the nice resolution was the end of it."

M. Vokrouhlikova, secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, seconded this statement when she discussed in that committee the report of the CSSR Ministry of Labor and Social Services on work disability compensation matters last year in the presence of the deputy minister of labor and social services, V. Marik: "When I took my turn in the function of V. Marik, he told me that he has been fighting for decades for an improvement in the quality and amount of work disability compensation." How many resolutions have been introduced in just this instance, how many speeches made at all kinds of levels, and the result? Disability compensation is the subject of complaints by the workers as well as of proceedings by appropriate agencies today as they were decades ago.

Of course, where the results of those nice resolutions lead is substantiated by the words of V. Marik: the birthrate is stagnating, in infant mortality we fell from the 4th place in Europe to the 20th place, in the average life expectancy of men and women and their mortality rate we have been in the 10th place in Europe and now we find ourselves in the last but one 27th place. As far as infant mortality is concerned, it has been realistically described by deputy Dr O. Trefny: "We used to be at the top, now we are sinking to the bottom." The deputies on the committee pointed out that in spite of the bad situation in the disability compensation area, the CSSR Government resolutions from 1973 and 1982 and of the CSSR Government Presidium of 1981, dealing with this problem, have not been implemented!

That is a reminder of only one instance of the proceedings of only one of the committees of the Federal Assembly. How long has the process of solving the problems of, for example, spare parts for almost anything, the trade network, supplies of industrial products, services for the public, been going on—in all cases we can find some resolutions which recognize the deficiencies and call for remedies.

This is unequivocally stated—even though from a different point of view—also in the analysis of the main pieces of information gained in processing citizens' complaints during last year, which was carried out by the CSSR People's Control Commission: "Based on the evaluation of the analyses of the federal central agencies for 1988, it must be stated that most of them limited themselves to interpreting statistical data, principally from the quantitative point of view. They do not offer a deeper look at the effectiveness of measures adapted previously, and they do not analyze why the deficiencies were not remedied. That is one of the reasons why the same problems continue to exist. The unsatisfactory solutions to deficiencies which bring on complaints proved to be one of the weakest points in the implementation of the CSSR Government resolution No 199/1988."

But this is not a criticism which would point out only the deficiencies and pass over in silence the successes of our society. After all, we belong among the advanced industrial countries, and in comparison with many socialist countries our standard of living is high. Here I would like to quote the words of CSSR Premier L. Adamec at a recent meeting on the occasion of the Railway Workers' Day: "We cannot live in the past. The conditions of our work in the world and here are changing rapidly. A number of countries are achieving higher growth rates and are beginning to surpass us. In some sectors of production, science, and technology we have not been successful in keeping in step with the world. Certain longstanding problems are growing worse. That is why we have chosen the way of restructuring."

The point simply is—and today more than ever—to introduce a policy of action. There is talk about the disappearing trust of citizens in both the central and the lower agencies, about the necessity to regain it, and renew their commitment and initiative. That, too, is the goal of the restructuring and democratization of society. But their meaning and goals must be fulfilled with concrete results. And that is just what the deputies of the legislative assemblies have in mind, and that is what the voters are concerned about.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Woetzel, Others Respond to Citizens' Concerns in Leipzig
90EG0033A Leipzig LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG in German
16 Oct 89 p 3

[Report by Uta Tok: "There Is Now Much To Consider and Much To Do"]

[Text] Sunday, 10 am—There is not a seat left in the "Moritzbastei" [bastion] where 1500 Leipzigers, who had accepted the invitation from the rector of the Karl-Marx University, assembled for the political morning drink. The discussion coming from the room where the event is taking place is being transmitted

throughout the other vaults. Before long the surge of discussion rises high. Quite understandable considering the subject which so deeply touches all of us "Socialism of the Nineties." Two others who signed last Monday's appeal have taken their seats next to the rector: Roland Woetzel, secretary of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] bezirk management, and the cabaret artiste Bernd-Lutz Lange. The fourth in this round is Prof Kurt Nowak, theologian at the Karl-Marx University and author—on Saturday we shall publish an excerpt from his latest novel. Greetings sent by Kurt Masur from Moscow and by Dr Dieter Zimmermann, who also was not able to attend, are received with applause. Applause, vehement at that, and loud interruptions are a common occurrence in the course of this morning, emotions, remarks, some full of impatience—I am guilty myself, I must confess. For nothing less is at issue than each and everyone's concern—socialism. None of the participants has left any doubt at all about this. Much more difficult is the conflict of opinions about what course of action should be taken now. Here now follows an attempt to recount important considerations, to include the LVZ [LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG] readers in the dispute.

Signals, Which Were Understood by Everyone

So now the first question, only a few hours before a new Monday evening: What was it that motivated the signers of last Monday's appeal to take this step? Bernd-Lutz Lange spoke. For many years already he had lively discussions with Roland Woetzel. He was not a comrade, and politically their opinions would differ at times. On that day they were in agreement fearing that events might become more critical. Therefore, in desperation their joint action with the other four. Agreement also prevailed regarding the urgently needed exchange of views on the perspective of socialism. "I believe, it's surgery we need, not cosmetics" the cabaret artiste formulated his position. And Roland Woetzel: "The appeal was an expression of our inner constitution, our worries about our city, our land. The people found themselves in an anxious situation, we wanted to put out a signal." What happened in recent days must now be internalized. Prof Nowak adds to this by saying that these events had symbolic meaning. Without violence, problems had found expression. However, we are not yet out of the woods with this Monday, not least in view of the fact that with the start of fall vacation the surge of travelers leaving the country had risen once again.

Bernhard Becker expressed his thanks for the appeal and emphasized that this had nothing to do with violating the rights of the SED and of the government. He appealed to the general public to refrain from demonstrations until the coming Central Committee conference in 4 weeks, because he knew how quickly all of this might get out of hand. A woman minister wants to know why a demonstration would not be sanctioned, after all the present dialog was the result of just such a demonstration. Prof Nowak makes reference to a term coined by Gorbachev: Demonstration democracy...But, the theologian continued, the question is: Is it the intention to exclude the

people from politics or not? "We want to discuss everything," counters Roland Woetzel. And Prof Hennig: "It is never too late for that. Signals have been raised, which were understood by everyone. The dialog is continuing, but not in the streets." "What we need are discussions, not demonstrations," a teacher from the 43rd High School began to speak. It is difficult to control rowdies. But she was aware of students' and parents' positions and attitudes from her many discussions with them. Being able to travel played a major role, cadre assignment according to subject competency, and she herself was concerned—as a result of her work with adult evening classes—that individuals without a specialist's diploma can earn more money than a teacher. With a democratic majority it should also be possible to turn down functionaries. She considered the discussion on the subject to be political work, in which the media should also participate.

A graduate of Dimitroff-EOS [college] school takes the floor. With all good intentions they had lively discussions at their school about the matters discussed here today as well as similar ones and in so doing had become a case and had to answer to commissions. Certainly it was not possible that these people were now completely above criticism, self-criticism within the party should be possible, after all. "Learning processes are taking place, we must go through them together," counters the rector. Another voice is heard (I did not catch the name) and draws attention to matters which must be discussed now, to problems experienced by everyone in everyday life. For example, the contradiction between supply and demand, existing privileges, limited travel opportunities and other shortcomings. Roland Woetzel: "It is important to talk about shortcomings. But at the same time we must look ahead, use the period of upheaval to make suggestions and proposals."

Yet in this context it had to be said, Bernd-Lutz Lange enters the discussion, that our media policy has been a failure. "Our media have to become interesting enough, so that we don't even get a chance to watch Western television."

Strong applause is repeated. Notwithstanding all these shows of impatience—I am siding with Prof Hennig who points out that changes require time. It is a matter of thorough deliberation, not procrastination. And: Not everything that has been achieved in this country in 40 years should be questioned. Comrade Prof Hennig: One should distinguish between what was good and what was bad. Our party's claim to leadership would have to be defined depending on the circumstances, dialog alone will not bring about any changes. "We must make socialism as attractive as we ourselves would like it. In this respect I feel in touch with the citizens of our country." The secretary of the bezirk management: "The claim to leadership is a result of knowledge, attitude, and setting an example. The nineties are a great challenge to our party."

Among High Hopes the Dialog Continues

Prof Kurt Nowak: Conceptions, subject competency have to become the issue, not resolutions. This concerns all parties. From their point of view, each would have to formulate how socialist democracy must manifest itself. Further: Anybody who wanted to be a politician from point zero on should receive a bonus to be able to participate in the development of a conception. He himself thought one immediate conception included freedom of travel. Applying deprovincialized thinking, this would enable us to classify problems here at home, it would be a step toward subject competency. Roland Woetzel reinforces: "We need a travel pass for every citizen."

To reach agreement on what type of socialism we need is extremely important. It requires a concept capable of standing the test of the years to come. Someone else from the round: A new base of trust would have to be created for this.

Two hours, an adequate discussion time for a morning drink, are coming to an end. Prof Nowak thanks His Magnificence for this opportunity. He admires civil courage and commitment on the part of the people assembled here. In the spirit of the previously mentioned deprovincialization it would be important to think about our state's cooperation capacity toward East and West. Characteristically, the French would speak of bisexuality in this context. On the one hand this would mean determining what socialism is, on the other hand cooperation and the capacity for peace toward the West. And once more Roland Woetzel who puts into words my own conviction by picking up the French bon mot: "The future belongs to love and socialism!" and adding that he was now finally consciously aware of new things, the dialog would be continued—free of illusions, with high hopes.

Reinhold on State of Socialism, Reform

90EG0032A East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 12 Oct 89 p 9

[Interview with Prof Dr Otto Reinhold, rector of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Central Committee, Academy for Social Sciences, by Barbara Baum: "How Specific Is Our Socialism? Questions on the Characteristics of the GDR's Social Development and Its National Identity"; date and place of interview not given; first paragraph is BERLINER ZEITUNG introduction]

[Text] At present, momentous changes are taking place in the world of socialism. Answers must be found to the question of what form the socialist society must take to accommodate new requirements. What characterizes socialism within the GDR's colors, was the subject of our discussion with Prof Dr Otto Reinhold, rector of the Academy for Social Sciences at the SED Central Committee.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: At present, social development in the socialist countries takes on a variety of forms and methods, which in some ways differ greatly from one another. For some time now, we speak of socialism in the colors of the GDR. Is there such a thing as a model for socialism or does each country fashion its own?

Dr Reinhold: It is the socialist countries' belief that there is not and cannot be a universal model for socialism. But this does not mean: so many countries—so many different types of socialism. Rather, it is important to start with common basic positions, with universally valid set patterns, which characterize socialist social order, yet to creatively use and exploit these under very specific circumstances. This concerns both the historical national conditions and the specific developmental conditions in the present. So when we talk about socialism in the colors of the GDR this merely means that we went our own unmistakable way, that our socialism shows characteristics that are in keeping with *our* circumstances, *our* experiences, traditions, and potentials. For socialism does not just occur somewhere and somehow but very concretely in the GDR, very concretely in the Soviet Union or in the CSSR. Each party and each country has put its own stamp on socialism as it is today and as it will develop.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: What correlation is there between the universal principles and the specific courses to be taken by each country?

Dr Reinhold: To reduce it to a common denominator: At issue is the general that is contained within the particular. Marx, Engels, and Lenin—extracting the essence from history, recognizing its trends and generalizing their own practical experiences—have pointed out the universal principles of a socialist society.

These include the political power of the working class in alliance with the rest of the working population, the Marxist-Leninist party's leading role, society's ownership in decisive production resources, social leadership, and planning as well as the dominance of the socialist ideology. These universal principles, as borne out by experience, are inalienable fundamentals without which there cannot be a successful development of socialism in the long run. But, of course, each country must realize them under its very own concrete circumstances.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: In view of the ever-growing diversity of approaches and forms in socialist countries, do positions maybe differ as well, meaning, for example, that individual universal principles take shape?

Dr Reinhold: No, that would be a contradiction in itself. That would mean having to reformulate constantly the fundamental elements of socialism's structure. The majority of socialist countries is based on the above mentioned basic positions. That does not necessarily preclude any discussions on these issues. There are representatives of communist parties who raise the question of whether some of the basic positions might not be obsolete, the party's leading role, for example. I think

this question arises precisely there where it is difficult right now to enforce this universal principle in actual practice. The party's leading role is not the result of any administrative directive but represents a daily struggle. To this effect the party needs a clear position as to what shape the socialist society should take in the future and what effort is required to win the majority of working people for the intended objectives. In the GDR we proceed from the belief that the general basic principles are indispensable to socialism.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: What determined and still determines our specific course?

Dr Reinhold: Well, for instance, the socialist property which took shape side-by-side with the existing private ownership of workmen and tradesmen. There was never any intention of disowning them even though there was some zigzagging, in tax legislation, for example.

An example to be cited is the multi-party system, which developed here after 1945. This and the fact that there are roughly 200 social organizations within the GDR that reflect specific interests of individual classes, groups, and strata, is considered to be an essential element of socialist democracy in some socialist countries today. This has always played a major role in the GDR's development.

We also have particular traditions, which are very important to the organization of a socialist society. For example, we have a working class whose majority has been linked to modern production for many generations, who has at its disposal ample revolutionary experiences in the struggle against exploitation, mass unemployment, and poor living conditions.

It is also characteristic that the GDR creates socialism at the dividing line between the two social systems and the strongest military alliances ever known to history. Naturally, this has greatly influenced our course.

One must also keep in mind that in our country the new society had to be built up on the material and intellectual ruins that fascism had left behind. To eradicate fascism and militarism from the root up were fundamental conditions for the transition to socialism. The GDR is conceivable only as an anti-Fascist-socialist nation. All other countries existed already as capitalist or semi-feudal countries. Therefore, Poland shall always remain Poland, Hungary always Hungary, regardless of how they will develop in the future. However, the GDR is inconceivable as a capitalist nation next to the capitalist FRG. And for this we must make allowances in any of our considerations.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: When you expounded this position, which is not new by any means, in a recent radio broadcast, it received many reactions in the FRG media.

Dr Reinhold: Yes, this talk caused quite a stir. Politicians and ideologists of every conviction reflected upon this and saw a gleam of hope. Something like: GDR

minus socialism equals reunification. Against the background of revived border discussions in the FRG—to be sure, there is not a small number of people who are once more dreaming of a Germany within the borders of 1937—nothing would please them more than that we draw away from our firm socialist positions, to ultimately retire socialism. That would really make concessions to the dangerous objectives of certain imperialist circles to change the status quo in Europe in their favor.

On the other hand they know, of course, that we leave no room for antisocialist positions, that we do not accept any form of bourgeois democracy. Because of this they insist that we are against reforms, want to disassociate ourselves from other socialist countries and the like. For to such supposed socialism-improvers reforms are only that which is antisocialist, that which might be conducive to jeopardizing the GDR's existence as a socialist nation.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: The fact that the GDR can only be a socialist nation and that a capitalist GDR as independent nation is inconceivable now leads the FRG media to the conclusion demagogically that we do not have a national identity.

Dr Reinhold: That is absurd. Precisely the fact that, among other things, the GDR is a *German* socialist nation, a workers-and-peasant nation on *German* soil, is what infuriates these people so against the GDR.

Compared to the FRG, which after the Second World War adopted the old power and social structures, which also adopted the history of capitalist Germany, the GDR is a totally new state.

The most important question of *our* national identity includes the fact that we had the courage and strength to break with Prussian militarism, to be finished once and for all with the Nazi past. What German anti-Fascist fighters strived for has been continued, has been and shall be realized. The new Germany, the GDR, is inconceivable without its anti-Fascist character.

Frequently, when our national identity is at issue, it is said that socialism emerged here on 8 May 1945, so to speak; the Soviet Union as the victorious power had forced socialism upon us. Indeed, prior to the GDR's existence there was not one day of socialism in Germany's history, while the capitalist social order adopted by the FRG exists for several centuries already. Thus, socialism is new here. But nobody had to force it on the German working class from the outside. Those who created the scientific socialism were none other than Marx and Engels! Together with them and after them, the German labor movement with many sacrifices and for a whole century has waged a war for socialism. It is precisely the socialism in the colors of the GDR with everything that distinguishes it from socialism in the Soviet Union or in other countries, which is an essential expression of our national identity.

Not least this also means that everything progressive in the history of the German people is being treasured here in the best sense, but also that we cultivate the national heritage worth preserving in the broadest sense. This year we celebrate the Muentzer anniversary, and at the same time I might mention the Luther festivities and much more.

Of course, our conviction that the GDR's national identity is determined by none other than its anti-Fascist-socialist development, is a sealed book to people who cannot comprehend a nation other than as a capitalist or bourgeois nation.

Therefore we shall continue to have great discords and confrontations with them, for example, with regard to recognition of our citizenship or their presumption of a so-called custodianship for all Germans.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: There appears an "adviser" now and then who wants to persuade us that the GDR would have to take a so-called third approach to develop socialism further.

Dr Reinhold: This is based on the concept that although we would not have to abandon socialism altogether, a bit of capitalism might be quite useful. SPD [Social Democratic Party] delegate Koerting from West Berlin coined the expression, the GDR should "Austrianize." Well, Austria is a beautiful country with very nice people. But it is capitalist.

Basically it always comes back to the same thing: There are fundamental differences in our ideas about reforms. In all problems of further development we are concerned with socialist solutions, these "advisers" are always concerned with changing our social system. It is quite interesting, how West German opinion managers become entangled in their own contradictions with these issues. On the one hand there is this thesis most frequently used by them right now that the development in Poland and Hungary is a manifestation of socialism's decline, indeed the end were imminent, whereas another thesis states that the GDR could not be successful unless it followed the same course as Poland or Hungary.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: The talk of such people, of this we are convinced, cannot do away with a socialist GDR. But could you comment on their claim that we in the GDR—in contrast to other people—are not capable of being reformed?

Dr Reinhold: The best response to this is supplied by the history of our land. Reforms and reorganizations occur in all stages of our development. Let us recall the democratic agrarian reform, the distribution of junker estates to the farmers and the removal of power from big landowners. Or the democratic school reform. It brought education to everyone. We performed university reforms, industrial, and agricultural price reforms, advanced our legal standards and our electoral system.

Without establishing the course for the chief task in its unity of economic and social policy—which represented a reform of previously formulated chief tasks—without the comprehensive intensification of the national economy, without creating combines, without the expansion of our leadership and planning system, the GDR would not have become the politically and economically stable state that is recognized worldwide.

This reform accomplishment takes place now, and took place in the past, against the backdrop of very complicated and by no means non-contradictory development processes. Our development also went through very difficult phases. Anything we started was always an advance into new territory, no model existed for this. And not always were the right conclusions drawn immediately from questions that had reached maturity; a learning process was needed to find the adequate forms of socialism in our country, namely socialist solutions.

BERLINER ZEITUNG: Which even the GDR does not have immediately at its finger tips for each newly matured question.

Dr Reinhold: Socialism will never be complete in the sense that all requirements are fulfilled. They develop quickly and new ones emerge. The important thing is that we promptly recognize matured problems and start the search for answers. This is the only way we can conquer the challenges of the future.

This will be accompanied by contradictions and problems, that much we anticipate. They can only be overcome if we succeed in increasing the effectiveness and attractiveness of socialism other than in the economic sector alone. The demand is not for reforms for reforms' sake, but for changes which benefit the advancement of socialism.

We must therefore constantly answer anew the questions on how to concretely achieve and realize our objectives, ideals and values, such as social security, the right to work—virtually realized—the solution to the housing issue as a social problem, the advancement of our youth, stable prices for basic goods, free development of talents and abilities, involvement of working people and population in all essential decisions in business and society in the respective historical phase. It is an inherent characteristic of socialism that it is inseparably linked to reform processes in all areas of social life. Nothing would be more damaging than stagnation symptoms in one or the other area.

Socialist National Identity Explicated, Justified

90EG0034A East Berlin DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE in German Vol 37, No 10-11, Oct-Nov 89 pp 913-924

[Article by Prof Dr Alfred Kosing, of the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Philosophy of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee (SED CC) Academy of Social Sciences]

[Text] The GDR has entered the fifth decade of its existence and development. What does this mean for the German nation and with which fundamental changes of its national life has this been associated? Forty years of revolutionary transformation of its social life have produced extremely important historic, irreversible results in the GDR. Not only have a socialist state and socialist society been established which differ in very fundamental ways from the imperialist state and the capitalist society of the FRG, but also there is now a new type of nation and a qualitatively new social-historic community, i.e., the socialist German nation. The program adopted by the SED at its 9th Party Congress in 1976 already stated, "The socialist revolution and the formation of the socialist society has also caused fundamental changes in the foundation, contents, and forms of national life. By coming to power, the working class has created the crucial prerequisite for the establishment of the socialist nation. Led by the working class, the people of the GDR—in accordance with the historic transition to socialism—have made their right to socioeconomic, state, and national self-determination a reality. In the GDR, the socialist German nation is on its way."¹

Development of the Socialist German Nation as a Legitimate Historic Process

The formation and further consolidation of the socialist German nation in the GDR is a legitimate process that is inseparably linked to the establishment of socialism and the continued formation of the developed socialist society. Because the contents and forms of national life do not exist independently from the respective society, they are intertwined with that society, with its political, economic, ideological, and cultural-intellectual principles and processes, and they change jointly with them together. This is also the reason why the formation of the socialist society had to lead to a renewal of the nation's basis for existence and hence to the transformation of the former capitalist [nation] into a socialist nation.

The revolutionary transformation process of social life in the GDR, in line with its roots and driving forces, has its origin in the history of the German people and is not the result of extraneous influences, although the latter have played a promoting and facilitating role. Of crucial importance is the fact that the socialist revolution is the necessary outcome of the more recent German history. Imperialism had thrown the German nation into two devastating world wars that jeopardized its physical existence. For that reason, the imperialist reign had to be destroyed and a change to socialism had to be made in order to ensure for the German nation a way to a peaceful future. This had been the goal of the German workers movement's revolutionary struggle for many decades; victory of socialism in the GDR means the successful completion of this struggle for social and national liberation. It is extremely important to understand this historic relationship through which the socialist German nation is deeply rooted in German history.

The objective of the SED, in partnership with all progressive forces throughout Germany, was to initiate this historic renewal process in order to lead the undivided German nation on its way to social progress and, in the process, ensure its unity. Afraid of losing their power positions, the German monopolistic bourgeoisie and the imperialist occupation powers prevented the implementation of the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945—which called for far-reaching democratization by way of depriving the industrial concerns of their power—and started on a policy of dividing the country and the nation. "It is better to have all of half of Germany than half of all of Germany," was Adenauer's motto. Thus, in September 1949, the FRG was set up as a separate state and later integrated into NATO so as to utilize its potential as a bulwark against socialism. As always, the imperialist bourgeoisie had put its egotistical class interests above the interests of the nation. Establishment of the GDR and transition to socialism was the inevitable response to these policies of national betrayal. On this basis, the GDR, together with all patriotic-minded forces, waged a determined battle to prevent the further dismemberment of the country and the disintegration of the unitary German nation. But the national and international balance of power resulting from that class struggle failed to accomplish that. Until the 1960's, the SED left no stone unturned to find ways of restoring the unity of Germany and the German nation; in the end, all possibilities for achieving this goal were exhausted because of social developments that meanwhile occurred in the GDR and FRG, and because of international changes.² Hence, in 1971, the Eighth SED Party Congress reached the conclusion that history had made a decision on the German issue and that there was no longer an "open German question."

Now, in order to preserve the peace, the only thing for the two German states with opposing social systems to do was to create normal mutual relations of peaceful coexistence, based on international law. Hence, the aim of the unwavering policy of the SED and the socialist German state was to establish cooperative relations with the FRG to preserve peace. "Never again must a war originate on German soil," this, from the very start, was the basic motto of the socialist German state. It took the capitalist FRG decades to comprehend and accept the historic reality of GDR existence, and it took the FRG even longer to acknowledge the special responsibility of the German states to preserve the peace and draw the necessary conclusions. And yet, the FRG continues to do so with ambivalent feelings, and forces continue to be at work which are more interested in new weapons and the modernization of nuclear arms than in disarmament.

Thus historic developments in the more than four decades since the German people was liberated from fascism created a completely new situation: the former German Reich was split into two independent German states, i.e., the socialist GDR and the capitalist FRG. Instead of a former unitary capitalist nation, there are now two German nations, namely, the socialist nation in

the GDR and the continuing capitalist nation in the FRG. These are historical realities which have objective economic, political, and social foundations.

Although, after a long learning process, the political representatives of the FRG eventually had to admit that the socialist GDR as an independent and sovereign state was just as much a creature of international law as all the other states, including the FRG, it remains very difficult for them to acknowledge that there is no longer an "open national issue" and that demands for the continued existence of a united German nation are ideological and legal fiction. Of course, one could say: let them have their illusions; there will be a time when they understand that the realities are stronger. However, this fiction, kept alive regardless of all reason and facts, is unfortunately dangerous! This is because it serves to justify the alleged "legal claim" for a reunited German state (patterned on the FRG), that is, the claim that the socialist GDR be somehow destroyed, be it through integration or fundamental changes of its political and socioeconomic conditions. Already now do we differ a great deal in our ideas about that—and these differences are considerable in terms of their forms and chronological occurrence—but at some time and somehow, the result is always supposed to be what the preamble of Bonn's Basic Law says, namely, a capitalist FRG embracing all Germans. Hence the FRG Government—contrary to all international legal regulations—adamantly refuses to acknowledge the GDR citizenship, claiming that all Germans are its citizens. This is not only an anachronistic viewpoint and policy, it is also and above all a constant obstacle for a comprehensive normalization of GDR-FRG relations, for peaceful cooperation in the interest of peace, and for the benefit of all people in both states. All such ambitions are of course illusions, because the victory of the socialist revolution in the GDR is irreversible, and the socialist society has proven to be a viable entity under any circumstances. The GDR is a firm component of the community of socialist states, and any hope for isolating it and making it leave that community is built on sand.

Nation and Nationality in German History

What is the basis for the theory of the continued existence of the unitary German nation? In suggesting this idea, the bourgeois ideologists and politicians use arguments that are plausible to many people: After all, we all are Germans, we have shared more than 1,000 years of history, we all speak the same language, we have a common culture, common habits, customs, and traditions. In addition, many people still have relatives on the other side of the border, and increased travel may improve mutual understanding. In comparison, the fact that we do live in different states is not that important. The conclusion hence is that there is only one German nation, which at some time in the future will again live in a unified state. So long as this is not the case, there remains the "open national issue" in Germany, or the "open German issue."

On the surface, this argumentation appears to be very valid because the fact is that we all are Germans—except for the about 100,000 Sorbian nationals in the GDR and the Danish citizens in the FRG. The German national language developed throughout a long common history; the German culture was created, and traditions, habits, and customs were shaped. But are these the determining elements, contents, and characteristics of a nation? Are all human beings who speak the same language and share a common culture part of a unitary nation? If this were true, there would be—except for the British—neither an American, Canadian, nor Australian nation. There would be no Dutch nation, because for many centuries they were without doubt part of the German people. And what about the Austrians who used to be Germans not too long ago, but meanwhile have unquestionably become the independent Austrian nation? Or how should we categorize the people of Alsace-Lorraine who used to be part of the German people, but who, for overwhelmingly socioeconomic and political reasons, left the German nation during the civil revolution to become part of the French nation?

What do all these historic examples show us? They prove that the ethnic community of mankind—like language, peculiarities of their culture and social psyche, traditions, habits and customs—are never the determinant and decisive basis for forming, developing, and defining nations. The ethnic properties and characteristics of the Germans evolved over a long history and are extraordinarily stable. In their totality, they constitute the ethnic characteristics of the Germans; they represent what we call "German," in contrast to "French," "English," "Russian," and "Polish," etc. The totality of ethnic characteristics forms the nationality of population groups as well as individuals. When we say that a group of people are Germans or that a specific person is German, then we determine their or his nationality. It does not say anything about the particular nation they belong to, since nation and nationality are by no means identical.

A nation is a very complex social organization, encompassing the economic, political, social, and ideological relations of people, classes, segments, and individuals. These relations have the character of a class in that they always are inseparably tied to a specific social formation. These social organizations also include ethnic ties and characteristics of people that are not typical of a given class. In other words, a nation combines social class and ethnic factors into a dialectic unit. During the nation's formation, consolidation, and development process, they interact in a dialectic manner, although the social class factors and components are the determinant ones. In the end, they decide the sociohistoric type of a specific nation, and it is on them that the formation and delimitation of a nation vis-a-vis other nations depend. Ethnic characteristics, the nationality, are and remain an important component of the nation because they combine the

ethnic properties of the population, classes, segments, and individuals who form a specific nation, but they do not make up a nation.

A review of the nation-nationality relationship in German history shows that the German nationality, the complex of ethnic characteristics considered "German," has evolved in over 1,000 years of history and combined itself with different social formations and their evolutionary forms, such as the feudal German groups, then the capitalist German nation, and currently the socialist German nation. Historic developments after World War II, leading to the partition of the German nation and to the creation of opposing states and social orders on German soil, illustrate the historic fact that the German nationality on GDR soil has become a socialist society that forms the socialist German nation, while in the FRG, the German nationality remains tied to the capitalist nation.

The people in the socialist GDR remain Germans, even if gradual changes do occur in the ethnic area. Likewise, the language in the GDR has taken on certain idiosyncrasies, which do not separate it from the German language itself or even transform it into a national language of the GDR, but which already characterize it as the German language in the GDR—just as, e.g., the German language in Austria has its own specific peculiarities. Typical traits of the socialist German national culture in the GDR are developing; a specific relationship to the entire German heritage is forming; gradually there are new customs, practices, and traditions in response to the socialist way of life, while old customs, practices, and traditions are changing their contents, combining themselves with the new socialist lifestyle, or are slowly disappearing. New behavioral patterns, ways of thinking, a new mentality and social psyche begin to form, without leaving the framework of the German ethos.

It is quite clear that the common nationality of the Germans in the socialist GDR and the capitalist FRG is a significant factor that facilitates communication and opportunities to influence each other. But that does not make a unitary nation, which requires much more than common ethnic properties and characteristics of the population. The unfounded ideas and claims of West German theoreticians and politicians are based on their quite intended confusion of nation and nationality and are an attempt to maintain the appearance of legitimacy. At the same time, they serve a specific ideological function, namely, to make the process for GDR citizens to identify with their socialist nation more difficult; this process which already is going on under unusual and complex circumstances, takes place in a very controversial manner. This is exactly what those politicians hope for, namely, to use more intensive travel contacts of the citizens of both German states as an instrument to disrupt the continuing consolidation of the socialist German nation and artificially awaken an "all-German" national awareness. However, these expectations will not

succeed because such an all-German national consciousness lacks a genuine social foundation. Just as travel between the Republic of Austria and the FRG does not make the Austrians give up the national identity they have developed over time, neither can travel be expected to affect the citizens in the GDR in this way. On the contrary, a more conscious comparison of social conditions will strengthen the conclusion that there already are two nations with different social setups and that they cannot be unified because they are inseparably tied to their respective societies. A capitalistic and a socialist society cannot be joined, and putting a nation that is independent from the opposing social order as a neutral roof over both is not possible.

Objectives and Subjectives in the Development of the Socialist German Nation

The formation and continued consolidation of the socialist German nation are an historic process that has its objective bases in the social life of socialism. Integration of the classes and segments of the GDR's socialist society into a qualitatively new social unit such as the socialist nation, actually occurs by way of the continuing development of the socialist economic, social, political, cultural-intellectual conditions, which interweave themselves ever so strongly with traditional ethnic ties and, as a result, take on the specific character of national relations. The citizens of the GDR are objectively molded into a new social unit through a tight network of national economic, social, political, cultural, ideological, socio-psychological, and linguistic ties in the national framework. This permeates everything in the socialist society, and in that sense it is not up to the individual to decide whether or not he wants to participate in it. Although people making their own history always do so under existing objective conditions and this is the only way for them to develop their activities. Hence, the existence and further development of the socialist German nation is an objective historic fact which does not depend on the will and conviction of the individual. Rather, it provides an objective basis for the individual's existence and his freedom to act as a social being. Most GDR citizens were born into these objective social and national conditions during the post World War II period and find in them the basis and framework for their individual activities and development. (Of course, this also applies to the FRG population with regard to the capitalist German nation.)

From the viewpoint of historical materialism, there is no doubt that this objective side of the nation is fundamental and determinant. This, however, does not mean that the nation should merely and exclusively be seen as an objective social organization. It also has a subjective side which in no way should not be underestimated. Subjective elements of the nation are its self-image as a nation, its national sentiment, and its national awareness. In these aspects of national psyche, people become aware of their national identity, associate their thinking and feelings, rationally and emotionally, with their nation, and understand and feel themselves as part of a

national community, at the same time viewing the socialist nation as a value. The subjective side is quite important for the social function and historic effectiveness of the nation—but more about that later. At this point, we still want to talk about the further development and strengthening of the nation's objective side. The SED program expresses the important idea that there is a dialectic interaction between the continuing formation of the developed socialist society and the development of the socialist nation. It reads, "Continued development of the characteristics of the socialist nation is accomplished by all social processes during the formation of the developed socialist society."³

In practice, this theoretical conception of the development of the socialist nation has proven to be correct. Formation and further consolidation of the socialist nation in the GDR is not a separate process requiring the application of artificial force—a force that is independent from total social development. It is an organic component of the ongoing formation of the developed socialist society. The socialist nation is a development form of the socialist society; the latter can only develop in a national form and by meeting national goals, it constantly reproduces national relations and ties.

The historic experiences of the GDR have confirmed the accuracy, in principle, of this idea, which is of particular importance in view of the enormously complex objective and subjective circumstances of the post World War II period. Thus the conclusion reached by the SED's 10th Party Congress, "The people of the GDR have...irrevocably decided in favor of socialism. Under working-class leadership, it has constituted itself as the socialist German nation. Nobody is able to change that,"⁴ has a strong empirical basis.

But the formation of the socialist nation has by no means stopped with its constitution. It has created the objective political, economic, social, and cultural-intellectual basis and contents of the socialist German nation. It took place in an historic process that started with the radical anti-Fascist-democratic change and essentially concluded with the complete victory of the socialist production facilities. The constitution of the socialist German nation was the first stage in the long-term process of changing a capitalist nation into a socialist nation and basically is linked to the transition period and the construction of the fundaments of socialism. Once the socialist society has reached a development stage where it can continue its further development with the help of its own resources, then the socialist nation has become an objective historic reality, i.e., a reality that is just as irreversible as the socialist society, of which it is the structural and developmental form.

However, complete development and full expression of the socialist nation require a substantially longer historical period. In that sense, the formulation of the socialist nation is a social process with a wide historic perspective, because it not only covers the emergence and strengthening of the objective bases and contents of the

socialist nation, but also those of the subjective components, of a new socialist-formed national understanding of itself and a socialist national awareness. It is only then that a socialist nation—to apply a formulation Marx used in a different context to the problems of nations—turns from a "nation in itself" into a "nation for itself;" it becomes conscious of its national identity, and only then can it become effective as an historic subject as well. The nature of the matter is that this process of molding and strengthening the subjective side of the socialist nation requires significantly more time than the objective one, for here it is a problem of overcoming deep-rooted traditions, attitudes, emotions, and also numerous prejudices.

The period during which the developed socialist society in the GDR is being formed is also a new stage in the process of forming the socialist German nation. It mainly consists of the continued formation, development, and complete unfolding of the socialist nation based on the already existing, new social foundation. This is the consolidation of the socialist German nation that takes place—on the basis, and in the aftermath, of far-reaching revolutionary changes—during the continuous effort to shape the developed socialist society. It is crucially important for the consolidation of the socialist nation in the GDR to strengthen and further develop its material, intellectual as well objective and subjective foundations. Thus the aim of the SED economic strategy is to set up an efficient material-technological basis with the help of scientific-technological advances, and to develop modern key technologies, especially microelectronics. This will also increase, intensify, and reinforce the new economic and social links between the nation's classes and segments. This will reinforce the economic foundation of the socialist nation and continue to shape its social character. Further socialization of production and work resulting from the already completed transition to intensively expanded reproduction, and strengthening the alliance of the working class and the class of agricultural cooperatives farmers, as well as the intelligentsia and workers in other sectors will achieve greater unity and stability of the socialist nation and increasingly give it the character of a genuine national community. With increasing demands on the working class, its national leadership role will expand.

The development of socialist democracy will be a major factor in stabilizing the political foundations of the socialist nation. Expected changes such as the development of democratic centralism as a unit of opposing but mutually dependent sides, the development of a public communications process to express divergent interests, demands, and expectations and achieve the coordination and harmonization of interests, as well as greater publicity in examining all basic social and national development issues are of overriding importance for the formation and strengthening of the socialist nation's subjective elements. Equally important are more differentiated forms of ideological work designed to deepen our social awareness, to achieve a fuller understanding of the basic

issues of our social development and thus facilitate a more comprehensive approximation of the aspirations and actions of all classes and segments with respect to the fundamental social goals, and to look upon them as national tasks.

The intellectual profile of the socialist German nation is largely determined by the development of its socialist national culture and relationship to our entire national and international cultural heritage. The variety and differences of intellectual needs and demands requires a deeper and wider understanding of national as well as international cultural developments. Hence all social processes involving the further formation of the developed socialist society contribute, directly or indirectly, to the consolidation of the socialist nation in the GDR, and the latter is becoming an important historic force for progress in our socialist society.

The Role of Socialist National Awareness

After the objective foundations and contents of the socialist German nation are essentially completed, it is the subjective elements that gain particular importance for the further development of its characteristic features. This applies above all to our new socialist national awareness, the formation and reinforcement of which is a major trait of the socialist German nation's consolidation. As the community of GDR citizens sees itself as an independent nation and identifies with the history of the socialist German nation and its goals and international responsibilities, the citizens of the GDR will become increasingly aware of their national identity, and particularly of the fact that it is different from both the capitalist German nation of the past and from the FRG. They gain a socialist national self-understanding and self-awareness, in which the socialist nation—*independent, yet rooted in the entire German history*—becomes the key point of reference and value.

This qualitatively new socialist national awareness develops on the basis of the socialist German nation as it really exists, and reflects the conditions of its material existence, its political development, its present situation, its problems, and difficulties. It is not a special form of social awareness, but is expressed by ideological, political, moral, and aesthetic awareness as well as everyday awareness of the people; in other words, it exists in other forms of social awareness and is transferred by the latter. This is also why it is more difficult to understand its development.

Further development of the socialist German nation's awareness is closely linked to the real continuing processes to shape the developed socialist society in the GDR; both processes are an inseparable unit. And the practical actions of the people to perform the economic, social, political, and cultural tasks of the socialist society are really the birthplace of the awareness of a socialist nation, because, on the one hand, it continues to strengthen the socialist German nation and, on the other, the social practices of the people provide the most vital

basis for expanding their awareness. Experiencing the socialist reality of what one has built with one's own efforts, being proud of the results one has achieved in doing so, knowing the accomplishments one attains despite difficulties, and knowing the remaining shortcomings and tasks to be resolved, fosters one's sense of solidarity with the socialist society and its form of national existence. This encourages stronger identification with the socialist nation, and that again is viewed and experienced as an important component of the socialist fatherland. This identification, as national self-awareness, has, in turn, a positive impact on strengthening the socialist society further. In this sense, the main task in its unity of economic and social politics, persistent work to ensure and keep improving the achieved material and cultural standard of living are major factors in the ongoing development and strengthening of socialist national awareness. Yet it is equally true that serious deficiencies, or even setbacks, in this development have a clearly negative impact on political consciousness as a whole and national awareness in particular.

There is an easy explanation for this: socialist national awareness in the GDR reflects the historical fact that we have a new social kind of German nation in the way the people think and feel. It reflects the historical past, the actual situation and the resulting present tasks as well as the future prospects of our socialist nation. It works its accomplishments and achievements into a complex of philosophical, historical and politico-ideological views and manifests itself not only in political convictions, attitudes, and behavior, but also in emotions. Here, it is entirely possible that one's identification with the own socialist nation may contain quite contradictory elements; there is absolutely no need for it to manifest itself in unconditional approval of past achievements and of the current conditions in our society and nation. It also can have critical reservations. Potential criticism of socialist national awareness is a positive factor which may have a mobilizing effect. It would therefore be very one-sided to view it as a negativism. To expect the development of awareness of the socialist German state to be without opposition and entirely affirmative would indicate an undialectic understanding of the complex development of the socialist German nation; in particular, it would ignore the inevitable contradictions between objective and subjective moments in the development of the nation.

Since socialist national awareness reflects the inner development of the socialist German nation as well as its standing in the international community of socialist nations—and beyond that in the international community of peoples and nation as a whole—it combines within itself socialist patriotism and socialist internationalism into an organic unit. "That makes it clear that any narrow-mindedness and restrictiveness is foreign to the national self-awareness of the GDR society. Our national pride has nothing in common with national arrogance. As patriots, we preserve and defend the

national dignity of our socialist fatherland; at the same time, we are consistent proletarian internationalists. Hence, our idea of national dignity includes responsibility vis-a-vis world socialism, the international workers movement, and all progressive forces."⁵

Awareness of the socialist nation is nothing passive because it not only reflects historical and social facts but is also an active element of the historical process. It has proven to be a major factor of integration that binds people to their own socialist nation. Self-awareness of the socialist nation is a necessary part of the development of a socialist nation, without which the nation could neither exist nor be able to act. Only the development of a stable socialist German national awareness completes the formation of the socialist German nation in the GDR. The subjective components of the socialist German nation are formed when the masses of people become aware of the objective changes occurring in the social life of their nation and make them part of their thoughts, feelings, and goals. Adequate national self-awareness, reflecting independent national existence, the conditions of socialist existence, the accomplishments, the real situation, the international standing and the prospects of the GDR socialist nation within the framework of the community of socialist states, is an absolute prerequisite for this nation to fully unfold its creative forces in order to further shape the developed socialist society, and at the same time its contribution to making the community of socialist states stronger.

The formation of socialist national awareness is an objective process in the sense that real existence and the social life process of the socialist nation are inevitably reflected in the social awareness of the people and that elements of this new national awareness are being created in the process. However, the only way in which such a fully formed and strengthened national consciousness cannot develop is in a spontaneous way. A spontaneously developing objective process forms both the basis and the starting point for conscious, active politico-ideological development efforts promoting and systematically pushing the formation of socialist German national awareness. It is very clear that under the complex historical prerequisites and conditions required to shape the GDR socialist nation, this can only be a lengthy and contradictory process. Many objective and subjective factors, in their interaction with one another, have a considerable effect on this. The fact that the socialist German nation is the product of the socialist transformation of only part of the formerly uniform capitalist German nation, that the capitalist German nation continues to exist in the FRG, that both of these—in their social setup opposing—nations are the outcome of a long history, that they share the same ethnic characteristics, and that both have the German nationality, makes the subjective integration of the objective social development processes much more difficult. In addition, the SED and all national-minded political forces in the GDR have waged an active and drawnout struggle over a long period of time to prevent

the division of Germany and the dismemberment of the unitary German nation and, later on, to keep open the channels for possible reunification. Thus ideas of how to preserve the unity of the German nation became very important for social awareness. In light of the social development of both the GDR and the FRG and of the far-reaching changes in the international situation, it does not come as a surprise that, after all possibilities were exhausted, this political goal became moot, and it was understandably difficult for politically active persons to digest the new objective situation in a deliberately subjective manner. We also have to keep in mind that those imperialist forces in the FRG, who have primary responsibility for Germany's partition, prefer to cover up their historical guilt and their illusionary ambitions to eliminate the socialist GDR through nationalist all-German ideology, so that a socialist German national awareness can only develop through constant discussions of this nationalist ideology in its diverse manifestations. Hence, in light of these circumstances, it should not be surprising that this would require longer periods of time than in nations with a less complex development process.

Legitimate pride in achievements produced under such difficult circumstances and in tangible accomplishments of the socialist society plays a large role in developing the contents of the socialist national awareness in the GDR. The active and internationally highly valued peace policy of the GDR, the solid material and cultural living standard of its working population, the international success of the GDR in its struggle for recognition and equality under international law, its important achievements in many areas and, finally, in sports competitions have provided a very important impetus to the development and consolidation of our socialist national awareness.

However, of great importance here is also a deeper understanding of the entire German history in its contradictory process, including the progressive, humanist, and revolutionary traditions as well as the reactionary sides and tendencies. To facilitate the continuing formation and to strengthen the awareness of the socialist nation, the science of history in the GDR is becoming increasingly involved in researching the entire German history and our whole historic heritage to clarify in an ever more differentiating way what this history has created in terms of preconditions and building stones for the socialist German nation.

The most important historical source for the development of our socialist national awareness is no doubt the history of the GDR and the development and growth of the socialist state and socialist society on German soil. It is of particular importance because it is our own history, as we shaped it, which is fundamentally different from any former historical processes in Germany. Working on these historic experiences and utilizing them to develop our socialist national awareness is not only an urgent task of history science.

The International Standing of the Socialist German Nation

From the very beginning, the constitution and further consolidation of the socialist German nation had an international dimension. The victory of the socialist revolution in one part of the former German Reich was closely linked to the international class struggle between socialism and imperialism in the postwar World War II era, and the development of the socialist GDR was only possible as a component of the community of socialist states, in close alliance with the USSR.

The further consolidation of the socialist German nation is tied by law to the trend in the socialist nations towards gradual rapprochement. Although historical experiences require us to correct simplifying ideas about the chronological course and forms of socialist internationalization, they do in fact confirm that this is a lawful tendency which, of necessity, is the result of the internationalization of production and of science and technology and releases an enormous development potential for the socialist society in both the national and international areas. However, it is a matter of extremely long-term, multi-layered, complex, and contradictory processes that must be directed and managed by the Marxist-Leninist parties with a sense of great responsibility. It shows that different starting points, different concrete-historical conditions, and specific national interests resulting from them, exercise considerable influence on the course, duration, and consolidation of socialist nations, on their social bases, and on their international approximation. This is because both processes depend on the socialist society's level of maturity, especially the development level of its productive forces, and on the degree to which its economic life has been internationalized. The CEMA member countries have made some progress in implementing the complex program to intensify and perfect the cooperation and development of socialist economic integration; it has also made some progress in putting specific target programs into effect. At the same time, it has become evident that the changes and reforms that must be undertaken in the different socialist countries are, for various reasons, handled and carried out in very different ways, so that the large variety of ways, forms, and methods to shape the economy and society continue to increase, and that this creates some new conditions for socialist internationalization.

Finally, a specific characteristic of efforts to consolidate the socialist German nation is that it continues to unfold under conditions of confrontation with the FRG imperialism. This is the special historical situation of the socialist German nation: It must live with a strong imperialist German neighbor-state which sticks to its demand that the socialist GDR be eliminated and eventually integrated into the imperialist power sphere. This is the hard core of the theory concerning the alleged continuation of a unified German nation. It is very clear that there can be no compromise whatsoever on this issue; there is no open question because the existence of the socialist GDR with its socialist social order, and

therefore also of a socialist German nation, is an irreversible historic reality that must be respected as an important element of European peace order.

The relationship between the two German states can only be formed on the basis of international law and the principles of peaceful coexistence. Still, on this general foundation, specific aspects of those relations that could become increasingly important, even if the FRG would be willing to exercise realism and goodwill at all times. On account of their German history, their geographic situation in Europe, and their position in opposing alliance systems, both German states have a special responsibility for preserving and safeguarding the peace. As immediate neighbors, they could develop normal relations up to the level of good-neighbornliness which would be of interest not only to the two countries, but which could also make an important contribution to the development of constructive and cooperative East-West relations.

The GDR is open to all initiatives serving peace, cooperation, and the well-being of mankind. But it will consistently reject all ambitions and actions that, under the pretext of an open German question, seek to eliminate the socialist society and hence the socialist German nation in the GDR.

Footnotes

1. SED Program, Berlin, 1976, p 56.
2. Cf. Hofmann, J., "Ein neues Deutschland soll es sein" [It Must Be a New Germany], Berlin, 1989, especially Sects. I and II.
3. SED Program, loc. cit., p 57.
4. SED CC Report to the 10th SED Party Congress. Reporter: E. Honecker, Berlin, 1981, p 28.
5. Honecker, E., "Die Aufgaben der Partei bei der Verwirklichung des 9. Parteitages der SED," [The Tasks of the Party in Implementing the Resolutions Adopted by the Ninth SED Party Congress], Berlin, 1978, p 73.

POLAND

Employee Cuts in Communist Youth Union Reflect National Decline

90EP0116A Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY in Polish 15 Oct 89 p 7

[Article by Jerzy Morawski: "After the Cassation: Youth Activists Cannot Be Sent into Early Retirement"]

[Text] On the last Monday of September, 200 ZSMP [Union of Socialist Polish Youth] ZG [Main Board] employees were informed that they should find other employment. The retrenched employees had not yet recovered from the news, when, after several days, they were handed contract termination notices effective 1 October. The leadership of the youth board pursued the

cut relentlessly and within a week dealt with colleagues who stood in the way. The senior employees among those put out on the pavement, still in the crawling stage in the ZMS [Union of Socialist Youth] and devoted to the cause like no one else, cannot remember a time when matters moved as fast as they do right now. Why not say it openly? Many tried and true activists had the ground knocked out from under them this fall.

The movement's leaders are beating their breasts and are admitting that the operation is painful. But, it is emphasized, no one should be shocked at all by it. A year ago, an attestation in the central office caused 20 people to be let go, while the local organization yielded up more than 400 people to the national organization. The ZSMP reports-elections campaign at the end of 1988/beginning of 1989 became another opportunity for bloodshed, if it may be expressed in this way: there were leadership cuts in the voivodships; large voivodships lost one deputy chief, small ones two. The trend towards cutbacks became more and more apparent. The April congress of the union reduced the leadership body from nine persons to six persons in regular posts, while the other leadership functions were transferred to the social aktiv. In July, the ZSMP ZG presidium passed a resolution reducing the local apparatus by 30 percent and the central apparatus by 40 percent. Danger threatened, and then everything quieted down in the crush of political events.

Can you imagine! The staff of the three-story building at 40 Smolna Street is resigned to what happened. Says one activist, "Every one of us has long been aware of the condition of the union and of the turn it has taken in policy." He adds that the ZSMP has ceased being the favorite child of the party and the government and was denied a generous amount of spending money for its survival.

Another activist, who was also one of those let go, stresses his own emotional link with the organization, which demands that he withdraw without sulking over it. But he found the way in which the dismissal was handled to be unfortunate. He explains, "Here, at the Main Board, we addressed each other informally as Stevie, Georgie and Johnny. We slapped each other on the back—the atmosphere was friendly. Suddenly, the leadership changed into ruthless employers and separated us into the better (those that remained) and the worse (those immediately dismissed)." Another one (who goes "unnamed so as not to create a stir") says that if he had been told 3 months ago: "Old man, you just do not fit into our plan, but we will give you a little time to find a job—then everything would be okay." But not this—thrown out all of a sudden.

Where are they to go? A man from the Siedlce Voivodship, brought into the central administration years ago, has spent his entire adult life working in the apparatus. He "rose up" in the ranks from the circle through the gmina and city echelons, and was finally promoted from the voivodship level to a higher level. He is 33 years old. His wife and child live at his in-laws' over 20 kilometers

from Warsaw. Until now he has been indebted to the union for everything—studies in Moscow and in the end a doctorate in Prague. Now he will be pretty much limited to his own home. Another activist was enticed into a leadership position in the central administration (he had four phones in his office) from a large industrial center. His wife and child have lodgings there. He also rents lodgings from someone in Warsaw. Earlier he was sent to Moscow to study and he earned a doctorate in philosophy there. He does not regret the years he worked in the union. He notes, "They gave me a great deal in the sense of intellectual and political development; constant contact with peasants throughout Poland and travel throughout the country. We are the last generation to belong to the party." He removes unneeded correspondence and notes from his desk drawer and tears them into pieces. He clears the shelves of books and brochures. The works of Marx, Lenin and Kim Il Sena (from his Korean colleagues) stand alone on the shelves. He says, "In terms of human capital, the loss is enormous, and these people are embittered and disillusioned about activism. It is a blow to the union."

From the very first, when comparisons were made, each one asked: Why is this one being put out on the pavement and not his colleague? In the end it is difficult to guess what criteria were used to weed people out, says another anonymous activist. Qualifications were not taken into account, for people with doctorates were let go, while those with a high school education, for example, were kept on. Nor did just being over the age limit of the organization of 35 come into play. In some cases, younger people were dismissed, while older ones were kept on. Nor were moral-ideological attitudes taken into consideration—an activist who had been reprimanded was kept, while those selected for dismissal had clean records.

In the opinion of a solid employee, the portion of the leadership which "is seeking to make this situation objective" acted arrogantly with the staff, demonstrating unprofessionalism and blundering. He adds that with such skills they will not be able to lead the union out in deep waters and they represent merely a threat to him. Where will this ship sail if the captain does not know how to use the helm?

Jan Krzeminski, deputy chairman of the ZSMP ZG, who was in charge of the cut in staff clearly does not concur with these sorts of arguments made by those who were shown the door. Says the deputy chairman, "Their criticism of the union leadership for acting inappropriately merely proves that the right people were let go. Moreover, is it possible to hide something like the intent to dismiss an employee in the Smolna Street building?" he asks, and answers that it is not possible. Let no one pretend to be surprised. The leadership did not announce what they planned to do and did not give the details since in this way they would undercut the branch on which they sat. In this way, they avoided pressure and nasty phone calls coming before the blow.

Deputy Chairman Krzeminski explains, "While union finances were not the sole reason for all the commotion, they were an important reason." The budget granted to the organization for all of 1989 was spent by April and the union congress added the final touch. Such an event for the youth movement as the youth festival in North Korea obviously did not add to the budget, but further drained it. The treasury was empty.

Each year the PZPR had approved the ZSMP budget, and all of a sudden the union has lost its state character. The autonomy of the movement was to be based on its loss of a government subsidy. In addition, Finance Minister Andrzej Wroblewski (called "our party man" on Smolna Street) twisted the regulations in such a way that he lost the Youth Social Action Fund [FASM], which (why pretend?) was a gold mine for the union. Within the FASM framework, youth of cities and rural areas did "socially useful" work (e.g., cleaning factory buildings) and a portion of the money earned went to maintain plant, municipal and central office echelons. This, too, was cut off.

Three weeks ago, Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz denied a proposal by the ZSMP ZG requesting additional financing. The state cannot afford to maintain youth activists full time. Deputy Chairman Krzeminski points out, "If we persisted, the cadre could have stayed on, but why? The ZSMP central office is no longer a transmitter for the ideas or orders of the PZPR CC. Let us save ourselves!—this is really not a new program, but a slogan for the coming months."

Our idea for the survival of the ZSMP central office is based on selling off a large part of its property. The union possesses often imposing voivodship headquarters, training centers and tourist vacation bureaus, duplicated agendas of the multibranch enterprise throughout Poland and the like. Official cars will be the first to be auctioned, since some of the drivers (as well as typists, accountants and secretaries) likewise have received notice of dismissal.

Following the sharp cutback, 50 persons (half of the administration) remain in the central office. It is unbelievable—the apparatus has disappeared. The memory of the good years of the 1970's brings tears to the eyes. The permanent aktiv took a deep breath, in spite of the fact that the movement has been reorganized into federations, amalgamations and the like. The boys from Smolna Street executed all orders zealously, and they moved their dreams to a building on the opposite side of Aleje Jerozolimskie. Many went to work at the PZPR CC. Today from the former ties there remains a common cafeteria, but any day now even that thread will be severed, since the youth activists will have their own dining facilities.

The honors report contradicted the Smolna Street cutback. A lady specialist on decorations (in the position for 15 years) has her hands full with work; piles of boxes with medals are heaped along the walls. But the medals

do not dry the tears of those who were dismissed. The whole problem is that youth activists cannot be sent into early retirement.

Financial Costs of Militia Upkeep Examined

90EP0134A Warsaw POGLAD in Polish
No 1, Sep 89 pp 4-5

[Article by Waldemar Maszenda: "How Much Do the Blue Squads Cost?"]

[Text] One of the more accurate thoughts of Vladimir Lenin was his proposed definition of a police state. If it spends more on the police-force than education, then it is certainly a police state. However, he lacked the imagination to tell that they would one day be only communist states.

Just like the military, the budget of the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] was, until now, an absolute tabu in Poland. Today, the doors to Rakowiecka have been somewhat opened to the public. The budget debate in the Senate during the 10 August hearing by the Senate Commission of Human Rights and Law and Order of high security and militia functionaries (Z. Pudysz, Z. Trzcinski, J. Lewiak) is disseminating some of the departmental secrets. It shows, however, that the MSW is, as before, operating practically without any public control.

If the department reveals that the 1989 indicator of price increases for equipment (communications, operation technologies, weapons, etc.) is 50-60 percent, which is associated with additional expenses of 25 billion zlotys, then, as before, nothing is known. The public might be inclined to finance the cost of these technologies at the stipulated amount (or even higher) if it knew where and against whom they would be used.

Currently, the militia manages to detect (data from the beginning of last August) 66.8 percent of crimes (80 percent last year). The fall in crime detection by as much as 13.2 percent, as given by the MSW, in the scope of only one year, is surely too large to be credible. Even if one considers that the Polish militia shows amazing helplessness in battling one of the more frequent crimes—burglaries of homes (60 percent of the perpetrators can count on complete impunity). Formerly, the MSW manipulated crime statistics to look good in the eyes of the political disposer and in propaganda aimed at the public. Today, these data serve to carve out as large a piece as possible from the state budget, in spite of the fact that the simplest solution suggests itself: more for the criminal militia, less for the SB [Security Service].

There are some interesting data in the note "On the Subject of Changes in the MSW Budget for 1989" of 8 August 1989, signed by the director of the finance department, Colonel Adam Dusza, a xerox copy of which fell into "unauthorized hands." It is clear that the most interesting thing is what this document leaves unsaid, namely, the individual outlays for particular

structures of the MSW. The budget law of last February disbursed 398.9 billion zlotys to the MO [Citizens' Militia], SB, and the MSW troops. The cited document does not specify how much of this will be designated for the militia, and how much for the SB. It is known that the Border Guard Troops' amount will be decreased, but it is not known to what specifically the saved funds will be directed. This 398.9 billion is not all, however. The February budget law provided 25 billion zlotys for the MSW's health service, 2.5 billion for the fire brigade, and 32.7 billion for investments.

In the mentioned note of the MSW finance director, we read, however, that only the 398.9 billion zlotys are shown under the "public safety" position, while the remaining amounts (25 billion + 2.5 billion + 32.7 billion—W.M.) are included in "properly oriented groups of state departments."

What does this mean in practice? Certain transfer of additional funds from the state budget for the MSW through other departments (health, construction, industry, etc.).

Thus, altogether, the MSW officially received (excluding foreign-currency funds, of which it is not known how much is received and for what purpose) 459 billion zlotys for 1989, in accordance with the February budget law. In mid-year, this turned out to be too small (because of inflation), and the department asked for an additional 298.7 billion zlotys, which have to be approved in a law, amended by the Sejm, on the budget that just fell through. In mid-year, it turned out that revenue advancement was about 30 percent (and expenses exceed 55 percent). The state is in no condition to raise taxes, and partly does not want to, since the gigantic PZPR-owned [Polish United Workers' Party] concern Prasa-Ksiazka-Ruch RSW [Workers' Cooperative Publishing House], generally, as it turned out, does not pay taxes.

In this situation, the savings proposed by Vice-Minister of the MSW, General Z. Pudysz, during the Senate hearing, and thus elimination of Department IV, which deals with the Church and religious minorities, are far from sufficient. The vice-minister responded evasively to the suggestion that Department III, which deals with the Opposition, should also be eliminated.

News Conference on Changes in Security Service, Militia

*90EP0134B Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
26 Oct 89 p 1*

[Article by Włodzimierz Słowiński: "There Will Be No More Surveillance"]

[Text] Wednesday's press conference by the government's deputy spokesman, Henryk Wozniakowski, was devoted to the militia [MO] and Security Service [SB]. Participants included: General Zbigniew Nowicki, deputy chief commander of the MO, Colonel Jerzy

Karpacz, envoy and deputy chief of the SB, and Wojciech Garstka, MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs] spokesman.

As of November 15, the Security Service will have 7.5 thousand permanent jobs, or 7 percent of all the jobs in the MSW. The SB workers must transfer to the militia.

There will be no surveillance of citizens (General Czesław Kiszcza reserved for himself the exclusive right to decide on its use in particular cases).

Delinquency is rapidly increasing. General Kiszcza announced an alert and committed the chiefs of the WUSW [Voivodship Office of Internal Affairs] to specific control of public areas and better detection of perpetrators of crimes. No one, especially from the district, is willing to work in the militia. Some towns have 50 percent of their posts vacant.

Preventive departments created in place of the ZOMO [Motorized Reserve of the Citizens' Militia] and existing in 22 voivodships, have 5,177 professional jobs and 13,000 functionaries performing military service. They will be concerned with patrolling, street traffic, ceremonial service, and help in case of natural calamities. The minister, premier, or Presidium of the Government will be able to decide on their use to restrain demonstrations.

General Kiszcza proposed to Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki the creation in the MSW of a political advisory committee, consisting of representatives of various political forces.

The MSW has grown to 40 organizational units. Now, instead of six departments (superstructure, religious unions, industry, agriculture, bureau of studies, and inspectorate of the defense industry), three will be introduced: preservation of the Constitution, economics, studies and analyses.

When asked if it could happen that some group of SB workers might want to take matters into their own hands, such as in the case of the murder of the Reverend Jerzy Popieluszko, Colonel Karpacz answered: "I guarantee that such cases cannot and will not take place".

ROMANIA

Visiting Mongolian Official Hails Cooperation

90EB0107A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 23 Sep 89 p 6

[Text] At the invitation of the Grand National Assembly [GNA], a parliamentary delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR], led by Lodongyn Richin, chairman of the People's Great Hural [PGH], recently visited Romania. The Mongolian guests met with working people in industry, agriculture, science, culture, and education and had talks with senior officials at the GNA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry

of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation. The highlight of the visit was an interview with President Nicolae Ceausescu, during which the sides emphasized the contribution that parliaments and parliament members can and must make to better understanding and rapprochement between nations. At a discussion, the high ranking guest very kindly answered the questions put to him.

"I looked forward with great interest and trepidation to my visit to your beautiful country. The visit was planned already in 1986, when a GNA delegation visited Mongolia. I want to take this opportunity to convey to the fraternal Romanian people our cordial greetings and best wishes on behalf of the Mongolian people. The purpose of our visits was to achieve a better mutual understanding and to expand the relations of friendship and cooperation between our countries and peoples. The visit ended with good results and was particularly rich in meetings and talks. We exchanged many impressions and we learned first hand of the great successes attained by Romania in building the new, socialist society and the scope of the rejuvenating changes taking place in your country, some of which occurred under our very eyes during our short stay in blossoming Bucharest. It is exhilarating to see on the spot the devotion and dedication with which all the Romanian people are implementing the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] policies, the faith with which they work, and the optimism with which they look to the future. The future belongs to those who build looking to the future, and from this viewpoint, the Romanian people, led by the RCP and Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, are in the vanguard thanks to the notable successes they attained in developing the national economy, science, and culture, in raising the living standard, and defending national independence and state sovereignty."

Highlighting the growing relations of friendship and cooperation between the Romanian and Mongolian peoples, the guest stated:

"The Mongolian and Romanian peoples are close friends, even though they are geographically far removed from each other. The Mongolian people harbor profound feelings and great esteem for the glorious RCP and the heroic Romanian people. Ever since we established diplomatic relations 40 years ago, the ties between our countries and peoples have been developing and expanding continuously, and they currently cover all socioeconomic areas. We highly appreciate the visit paid to Mongolia in 1988 by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu; his talks and agreements with Comrade Jambyn Batmonh opened up a new era in the history of Mongolian-Romanian relations. In the area of domestic policies, I want to stress that economic and scientific-technical cooperation and cooperation in other mutually advantageous areas was diversified, while in the area of international relations, we closely cooperate in matters of major interest in the world. Mongolia is thoroughly familiar with Romania's policy of peace, understanding, and cooperation with all the states, an active and consistent

policy that has made your country into a prestigious member of the international community. Romania has presented many valuable proposals and initiatives at the United Nations, its specialized bodies, and at various international meetings, concerning disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament, security and cooperation in Europe, forging a new world economic order, declaring an international youth year, establishing an area free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans, etc., which has enhanced Romania's prestige in the international arena. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the founder of modern Romania and the inspiration of its prestigious foreign policy, deserves exceptional merit along this line."

Referring to the parliamentary relations between our countries and the role of our parliaments in developing the Romanian-Mongolian relations and, in a broader context, in resolving the major problems of the contemporary world, the guest said:

"We believe that the relations between the Mongolian and Romanian parliaments—traditional relations cemented through long-standing and fruitful cooperation—are very good and are continuously developing. Each one of the meetings and talks between Mongolian and Romanian parliament members proceeded in a working atmosphere, to the advantage of both countries. The frequency of our meetings and contacts is in keeping with our joint objective: to promote better mutual understanding and continuous rapprochement between our nations.

"I want to emphasize the major, highly important role played by parliaments and parliament members in international life. In our specific case, we discuss and examine urgent, topical international issues with the parliaments and parliamentarians of other countries with a view to agreeing on joint actions. Our meetings and talks with Romanian parliamentarians afforded us a good opportunity to discuss in detail the current stage of bilateral relations and the steps we should jointly take on matters of major interest. We also briefed each other and decided on the main directions of our future cooperation. Parliamentary meetings at various levels, regional or broader levels, have brought us to the conclusion that parliaments and their members play a positive and important role in international life, a role that will increase even more in the future."

Invited to talk about areas in which the Romanian-Mongolian relations have good chances of developing in the immediate and more distant future, Lodongiyin Rinchin said:

"In the political area, the cooperation between our countries is at a very high level. The same in the international arena. Cultural exchanges are at a good level and are continuously progressing. The areas in which we should do more are those of economic and trade relations. Generally, the volume of our economic exchanges is not very large, mostly due to our country's

relatively low economic potential. Nevertheless, the volume of Mongolian-Romanian economic and trade exchanges has quintupled in the past 5-year plan in relation to the previous period. In the current 5-year plan our economic relations are proceeding along the lines of long-term bilateral agreements, but I believe that there are still untapped resources for expanding and increasing the volume of our exchanges. We would like to take greater advantage of Romania's economic assistance and to see an increase in the contribution of Romanian experts and technicians to speeding up our socioeconomic development and the development of the new, socialist society. In some areas we cooperated well in the past and continue to cooperate excellently now. I am referring to geological prospecting, for example, an area in which Romania made intensive and successful efforts, thanks to which our natural riches are now well known. An intergovernmental commission is now studying various other areas of mutual interest presenting possibilities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation which I am positive will soon materialize and in which Mongolian-Romanian economic relations will expand and diversify."

Our talk with the Mongolian official took place shortly after his interview with President Nicolae Ceausescu. Still under the strong impression of that meeting, Londoyn Rinchin told us:

"It was a special honor for us to be received by President Nicolae Ceausescu, who is leading the Romanian people along the glorious path of struggle at the most fruitful and dynamic stage in their development. Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu told us about the major directions of socialist Romania's foreign policy and the country's socioeconomic prospects. We recently read the draft Program-Directive and the Theses for the 14th party congress and noted a few figures, but after this meeting, Romania's future appears much clearer and more promising both in the immediate future and by 2000 and even 2010, since it is already certain that it will achieve new notable victories in socioeconomic development and in raising the living standard.

"We have much to learn from you in the area of socioeconomic management; many of the methods that Romania has long been implementing are beginning to be implemented in our country, too, such as self-management, self-administration, and self-financing, which we have begun introducing in the Mongolian economy, naturally adapted to the conditions specific to our country. We are now placing greater emphasis on decentralization, eliminating bureaucratic steps, and more closely involving working people in their production activities. We are improving the training and multiple qualifications of economic cadres, as well as their political training, so that they can best fulfill the tasks established for all the people by the 19th party congress. We are working on a new constitution, a new party program, and a new socioeconomic development plan, which we will discuss at the next party congress, which is scheduled for next year or at the latest 1991.

"I want to end by wishing the Romanian people new successes in fulfilling the tasks of the current 5-year plan and on the eve of the 14th party congress. All these successes and the wonderful and spectacular achievements attained so far are an expression of the Romanians' heroic labor and the result of the firm and consistent implementation of their party policies."

Ministry of Metallurgy Reorganized

90EB0123A Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian 23 Oct 89 pp 1-3

[Text]

State Council Decree on Improving the Activities of the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry [MMI] and Its Units

The State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees:

Article 1—Article 19 of State Council Decree No 673/1969 concerning the organization and running of MMI, which became Law No 53/1969, including subsequent amendments, is modified as follows:

"Article 19—The MMI has the following organizational structure:

a) Directorate for plan, production, and development; b) Technical directorate; c) Directorate for investments and construction-assembly; d) Directorate for organization, supervision, personnel-training, remuneration, and legal advice; e) Directorate for finances-prices and secretariat-administration; f) Mechanical-energy and automation directorate; g) Foreign trade and international economic cooperation directorate; h) Supply and marketing directorate.

"The organizational structure according to job departments and the maximum number of ministry personnel are given in Annexes No 1 and 2 [not reproduced].

"The duties and norms of the departments envisaged in paragraph 1 are established by the ministry managerial council in accordance with the law."

Article 2—On the date of the present decree, the following industrial units are established under MMI guidance and supervision:

a) A metallurgical complex in Tigraviste, with headquarters in the municipality of Tigraviste, to manufacture the following products: alloyed steels, finished rolled steel bars, rust-free and silicon steel strips and sheets, siderurgical electrodes, and other coal materials. The plant will also carry out all categories of repairs, and investment and construction-assembly work for ministry units;

b) A metallurgical complex in Calarasi, with headquarters in the municipality of Calarasi, to manufacture the following products: metallurgical coke, pig iron, steel, solid rolled steel, steel rails, calibrated steel, and steel

bars. The plant will also carry out all categories of repairs, and investment and construction-assembly work;

c) A complex for ferrous alloys in Tulcea, with headquarters in the municipality of Tulcea, designed to manufacture ferrous alloys and magnesium bricks.

Article 3—The complexes established according to Article 2 will be run on the basis of workers self-management and economic-financial self-administration; they will have legal status and will be organized in keeping with legal norms concerning the organization and management of state socialist units.

Article 4—The complexes listed under Article 2 will have the organizational structure given in Annexes No 3, 4, and 5 [not reproduced]. The Tigraviste and Calarasi metallurgical complexes will be incorporated in the special organization category, while the Tulcea ferrous alloys complex will be incorporated in category I, branch group II.

Article 5—The maximum number of working personnel in the apparatus of the Bucharest Industrial Metallurgical Processing Central and the Brasov Industrial Central for Refractory Products is given in Annex No 6 [not reproduced], and that of Galati, Hunedoara, and Resita industrial metallurgical centrals, who are on central pay schedule, in Annex No 7 [not reproduced].

Article 6—The organizational structures of the Bucharest Industrial Central for Metallurgical Processing and the Brasov Industrial Central for Refractory Products are given in Annexes No 8 and 9 [not reproduced].

Article 7—On the date of the present decree, the name of the Central Institute of Metallurgical Research is changed into the Bucharest Central Institute for Metallurgical Scientific Research and Technical Engineering [BCIMSRTE]. The institute will be run under the guidance and supervision of the MMI and the National Committee for Science and Technology.

The units that will make up the institute are listed in Annex No 10 [not reproduced].

The institute will be managed by a director general and a deputy director general.

The director general of the institute is also director of the Bucharest Institute of Metallurgical Scientific Research and Technical Engineering [BIMSRTE].

The apparatus and departments of the BIMSRTE will also serve the BCIMSRTE.

Article 8—On the date of the present decree the BIMSRTE is established, with headquarters in the municipality of Bucharest. The institute will be subordinated to the BCIMSRTE and will deal with metallurgical scientific research and technological engineering, abrasive and coal products, and industrial production activities.

The institute will take over the activities of the Bucharest Metallurgical Research Institute, the Bucharest Institute for Metallurgical Sections and Plants Design, and the Bucharest Institute for the Design of Rolled Steel Departments and Plants, which are dismantled.

The BIMSRTE will feature a workshop in charge of organizing and modernizing production processes and establishing technical standards and norms for consumption.

Article 9—The BIMSRTE will be organized as a large institute and will be run on the basis of workers self-management and economic-financial self-administration; it will have legal status, in accordance with the provisions of State Council Decree No 297/1973 on uniform structure norms for research and design units, and State Council Decree No 162/1973 on uniform structure norms for economic units. Its organizational structure is listed in Annex No 10A [not reproduced].

The structural departments of the institute will handle scientific research, technological engineering, and industrial production.

Article 10—The BIMSRTE will be incorporated in remuneration level I for certified scientific research personnel and remuneration level II for certified technological engineering personnel.

University graduates employed in professional positions will maintain their professional grade and remuneration, provided they continue to do the same job.

Scientific research and technological engineering personnel with non-certified higher education or without higher education, personnel employed in structural compartments, and working personnel employed in industrial production, as well as the deputy technical director and production deputy director, the chief accountant, and the chief engineer are paid according to the branch group and organizational grade to which they belonged prior to the present decree.

Article 11—On the date of the present decree, the Galati Institute for Manufacturing Research and Design for Metal Coverings and Flat Products, which belongs to the Galati Metallurgical Central, is reorganized as the Research, Technological Engineering, and Design Center for Metal Coverings and Flat Products [RTEDCMCFP], with the same remuneration level and branch group.

On the same date, research and design centrals subordinated to certain industrial centrals and complexes will change their names according to Annex No 11 [not reproduced].

Article 12—On the date of the present decree, an Accounting and Computation Center for Metallurgy is established, under MMI guidance and supervision. Its purpose is to work out electronic computation and record keeping projects for the MMI and its units.

Article 13—The Accounting and Computation Center for Metallurgy Bucharest is organized and will function on the basis of workers self-management and financial-economic self-administration; it will have legal status according to legal norms concerning the organization and management of state socialist units and to State Council Decree No 499/1973 concerning the uniform organization of data processing activities and measures to improve economic management systems. The center will be incorporated in organizational grade II.

Article 14—On the date of the present decree, the Electronic Data Processing Center of Metallurgical Industry and the Center for Improved Training of Workers in the Metallurgical Industry are dismantled.

Article 15—On the date of the present decree, economic units belonging to certain industrial centrals and complexes and under MMI guidance and supervision, listed in Annex No 12 [not reproduced], are organized as plants with legal status.

On the same date, the units listed under Annex No 13 [not reproduced] become answerable to a different body.

On the same date, the units listed in Annex No 14 [not reproduced] are organized as units with legal status.

The units listed under paragraphs 1 and 3 will be organized in accordance with Article 26 of Law No 5/1978 concerning the organization and management of state socialist units on the basis of workers self-management and economic-financial self-administration.

Article 16—On the date of the present decree, construction-assembly contractors, metallurgical and construction heavy equipment repair units, and supply and marketing units are transferred from the MMI to industrial centrals, as listed in Annex No 15 [not reproduced].

Article 17—On the date of the present decree, the Port Enterprise for Metallurgical Products, with headquarters in Constanta, which was under MMI supervision and guidance, is transferred to the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, Maritime Transportation Department.

Article 18—On the date of the present decree, the Tirgoviste Special Steels Complex will change its name into the Tirgoviste Metallurgical Complex, and the Tulcea Metallurgical Complex will change its name into the Tulcea Ferrous Alloys Complex.

On the same date, the Construction-Assembly Contracting Enterprise of Calarasi will change its name into Calarasi Construction-Assembly and Metallurgical Repairs Contracting Enterprise. Its profile will be changed accordingly to feature metallurgical repairs.

Article 19—Units under the guidance and supervision of the MMI are listed in Annex No 16 [not reproduced].

Industrial centrals and complexes are responsible for the units listed in Annexes No 17-23 [not reproduced].

Article 20—The assets and debts calculated on the basis of balance sheets established on the date of the present decree, as well as economic and financial plan indexes and contracts are transferred from the reorganized units to the units taking over their activities in keeping with the present decree, on the basis of protocol.

Article 21—The personnel transferred on the job or reassigned within the same unit to lower grade positions, and personnel who became superannuated in consequence of the implementation of the present decree are entitled to the rights envisaged in Article 21 of State Council Decree No 162-1973 on uniform structural norms for economic units.

Article 22—The provisions of State Council Decree No 367/1980 featuring measures to rationally utilize personnel in socialist units, the validity of which was extended under State Council Decree No 29/1989, do not apply to positions within the MMI and its units, and to those in units from which or to which personnel was transferred in consequence of the present decree.

Article 23—The State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance will amend the national uniform plan of socioeconomic development and the volume and structure of the 1989 budget in accordance with the implementation of the present decree.

Article 24—Annexes No 1-23 [not reproduced] are part and parcel of the present decree.

Article 25—State Council Decree No 12/1974 on measures to improve research and design activities in the metallurgical industry, State Council Decree No 451/1976 on the reorganization of the Bucharest Institute of Metallurgical Research, and State Council Decree No 1365/1974 on the establishment of the Electronic Computation Center of the Metallurgical Industry, belonging to the MMI, are abrogated.

Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania,
Bucharest, 20 October 1989, No 260

YUGOSLAVIA

First Direct Election of Croatian Party Officials Discussed

90EB0098A Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 7 Oct 89 p 6

[Interview with Mira Korkut-Slatkovic, member of the Presidium of the Croatian League of Communists Central Committee, by Branko Tudjen: "No More Orders Issued!"; date and place not given]

[Text] More than 300,000 members of the Croatian LC [League of Communists] voted directly on 13 and 14 October among the candidates listed for membership of

bodies, political executive bodies, and chairmen of bodies from opicina organizations all the way to the Central Committee. This is a kind of innovation in party practice. Never before in the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] or any of its segments have the rank and file voted directly on the leadership. In this act, the Croatian LC has even anticipated the government bodies in the Socialist Republic of Croatia [SR Croatia], which at present are not elected directly. Because of obstacles in the bylaws, the last word will be said by the conferences and the congress, although it is logical to assume that the delegates will confirm the desire of the membership. The direct vote eliminates the need to set up working groups, commissions, and other bodies which in the past have shortened the lists. Those groups had great power; they filtered the candidates, passed "their own," and thus had an essential influence on the election of bodies, political executive bodies, and their chairmen.

We asked Mira Korkut-Slatkovic, member of the Presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee, who is responsible for personnel policy, what led the Croatian LC to incline to the principle of direct election.

[Korkut-Slatkovic] This is a logical consequence of what we began 4 years ago when on the slates for the secret ballot we had more candidates than positions to be filled. That was an essentially new practice for the time. We were not received with understanding by one segment of the public; there was a fear about the class-social and ethnic composition of those elected. But experience has shown that there was no reason for fear, at least as far as these two areas are concerned. Even then, we adopted the restriction on the term of office. This practice has now been taken up by certain other segments of the LCY as well. Slates with more candidates than positions to be filled and the secret ballot are emphasized as a particular achievement in democratization. That is no longer enough for us. We want to get as close as possible to direct elections. Certain provisions in the bylaws still do not allow us to adopt the practice of full application of that principle.

[VECERNJI LIST] Today, perhaps there is more fear about the ethnic composition of those elected than there was 4 years ago. What protection is there against possible surprises?

[Korkut-Slatkovic] We are aware that the situation in this area is not what it was 4 years ago. That is why we have provided that the electoral conferences may, after the direct vote on candidates for bodies, political executive bodies, and chairmen, add candidates if they find an essential disruption of the ethnic or class-social content. If the same thing or something similar occurs in the election conferences or in the election of political executive bodies, the elections will be repeated.

[VECERNJI LIST] One can understand the concern about the ethnic and class-social composition. However, how does one reconcile this with the fact that in a way this does after all rig the elections?

[Korkut-Slatkovic] We have stopped talking about quotas, since we want quality, but we cannot abandon certain basic things which are fundamental in the League of Communists. This is the first time that there have been no orders issued concerning a single candidate. Our center received thousands of names. All of those nominations started with basic organizations. They are thereby taking on a great part of the responsibility as well.

[VECERNJI LIST] Objections have been made in recent days that there were few workers and many directors.

[Korkut-Slatkovic] Indeed, we are receiving objections, not concerning individuals, but rather, for example, that there are not very many workers. But these complaints are coming precisely from the communities in which few workers were nominated. We received an objection from a youth organization to the effect that there were not enough young people. As though the nomination process was not an occasion for that youth organization.

[VECERNJI LIST] In your judgment, are all the best people whom the Croatian LC possesses at the moment on the candidate slates? We are, of course, thinking of all of those who could qualify to be on the slates in view of the criteria.

[Korkut-Slatkovic] I cannot say that all the best are on the slates. There are thousands of candidates; who would be able to know them all? I trust the communities and the basic organizations which nominated them. I must also say this: There are basic organizations which themselves emphasize that these people were only good workers or good party treasurers, but they are nominating them for the political executive body of the Croatian LC Central Committee. But perhaps that is also a message to us who are now in office.

[VECERNJI LIST] What kind of message?

[Korkut-Slatkovic] After the election, it would be good to analyze everything that happened in the basic organizations of the Croatian LC and what motivated the particular organizations to nominate particular people. I am personally convinced that there are messages of a kind. There are candidates, for instance, with little political experience who are esteemed in their own communities. As I see it, this is either a demand for absolute changes in the leadership or an assessment of the present leadership in the sense of whatever those people can do can be done by these just as well.

[VECERNJI LIST] It is also true that a large number of those nominated did not accept the nomination.

[Korkut-Slatkovic] People took advantage of the right to decide themselves whether they wanted to be involved in that process or not. There are several answers to that. There was less of that kind of refusal for volunteer positions than for professional positions. It seems to me that many people were bothered by the procedure, that

is, by the nomination and election under altered conditions. But at this point there are not very many people ready to engage in politics as professionals. They know what it would mean to leave their own community at a time when large changes of the economic and political system are being prepared. Ahead of us is a period of extensive reorganization in work organizations when no one will any longer be certain of his job.

[VECERNJI LIST] There were also open disagreements with the criteria.

[Korkut-Slatkovic] The criteria were initiated at the First Conference of the LCY and adopted in the 17th Meeting of the LCY Central Committee. We had to adopt them for two reasons: We thought that we finally had to carry out the conclusions and that we immediately had to give up the practice, once we agree on something, of immediately finding all possible faults in what we had agreed on.

[VECERNJI LIST] There was particular dissatisfaction with the limitation of the term of office. Those who are dissatisfied say: What is the point of the limitation on the term of office when the membership has voted directly?

[Korkut-Slatkovic] The limitation of the term of office is something set down in the bylaws and confirmed at the last congress. This generation of leaders did not have the right to change that. It is under that condition that quite a few leaders left the scene on the eve of the last congress. But in view of the direct elections perhaps the restriction should in fact be removed. At the same time, I think that 8 years spent in one position is quite enough.

[VECERNJI LIST] Another remark had to do with the fact that those who hold government office could not be on a party slate.

[Korkut-Slatkovic] Those are people who already hold very responsible positions, they are occupationally and professionally active in carrying out tasks that are part of the policy of the LC. Accordingly, we have not lost them. The fact that they are not members of bodies at the moment or are not nominated for them, does not mean that they are outside the party. Their greatest responsibility is precisely to meet the requirements of the League of Communists in the jobs they hold.

[VECERNJI LIST] It is also a fact that the list for the political executive body of the LCY Central Committee was later supplemented. It seems that there was not really very much interest in holding that post in Belgrade.

[Korkut-Slatkovic] We had more than 200 nominees for the political executive body of the LCY Central Committee. Many of them exercised the right to withhold their consent. Recently, it has been very difficult to get people from other parts of SR Croatia for professional jobs in Zagreb, and this is even more the case for jobs in Belgrade. The reasons are simple: separation from

family, a different personal income, and particular efforts. Up until the last day, our slate looked different from the one presented at the plenum. Individuals dropped out at the last moment, so that the evening before the meeting we were faced with a fait accompli. It was a good thing, then, that the list was supplemented in the plenum itself, but this does not mean that people will not drop out even after the membership votes directly.

[VECERNJI LIST] Of the 13 members of the present presidium of the Croatian LC Central Committee, only 2 could be reelected because of the limitation of the term of office. Only one is on the list of nominees. How about continuity?

[Korkut-Slatkovic] I see the continuity of politics in the membership and in the body, not in the political executive body. Accordingly, I am not very much concerned that Ivan Grzetic is the only 1 of the 13 members of the present Presidium nominated to this position again. The other one who could have been elected, Stjepko Gugic, had already committed himself to work of another kind before this.

[VECERNJI LIST] Nor are the present chairman Stanko Stojcevic and the secretary Dragutin Dimitrovic on the list of nominees. Why?

[Korkut-Slatkovic] Stojcevic and Dimitrovic were nominated in many basic organizations all over the republic. However, neither of them accepted the nomination, and they informed their basic organizations to that effect. It is well known that the Zagreb City Committee of the Croatian LC, which did not concur in Stojcevic's refusal of consent to be nominated to the LCY Central Committee, sent a request to the Croatian LC Central Committee to take up this question once again. But it is primarily the right of every individual to decide about himself.

[VECERNJI LIST] Where will they be continuing their careers?

[Korkut-Slatkovic] Both have said that they want to go back to the work and the tasks of their own basic professions.

Dissident Writer Recounts Prison Experiences

90EB0021B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
26 Sep 89 pp 42-43

[Article by Jasmina Kuzmanovic, includes interview with writer Vlado Gotovac: "Getting Off the Blacklist"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Just a few months have passed since the forum on "blacklists" that was organized at the beginning of the year by the Croatian Writers' Society. Although there was a discussion then for the first time in public of the existence of media "screening" for political undesirables, and of its very well developed graduated scale, there were nevertheless very few writers at the forum who were willing to speak out publicly about "their

cases." The fear of further stigmatization, and a possible turnaround in the public atmosphere, probably prevented many people from using their non-anonymous experience to compile a more concrete indictment of the "blacklist" phenomenon.

Last Thursday, the Zagreb office of Cankarjeva Zalozba presented a book by a writer who in many respects is another name for such a practice. "My Case," by Vlado Gotovac, can hardly be presented as just one more collage of essays and fiction, because of the very nature of the book. After all, this is not Gotovac's first book after several years of silence; he published a collection of poetry, *ZABRANJENA VJEĆNOST* ["Forbidden Eternity"] in 1987, issued by NAPRIJED in Zagreb, but afterwards it came out that book did not even receive the usual bibliographic cataloging.

"My Case" is undoubtedly the first published dossier on the trial of a writer and journalist for participating in the Maspok [MASOVNI POKRET, mass movement] in Croatia in 1971. At the same time, its appearance, at least as things stand now, also means the emergence of its author from the blacklisted realm. The book's publication was noted in various newspapers, even outside the republic's borders. Gotovac is giving statements to the press, and agreeing to interviews. With Gotovac's book in hand, it becomes clear even to the most innocent as well as the most suspicious reader that the specter of 1971 in Croatia has resulted, among other things, in a media "black hole" regarding that period and its protagonists. Finally, what is known about the details of Gotovac's trial, and what, in particular, do people under 30 know about it today?

In the democratization of public life and the expansion of room for open dialogue, it was inevitable that after 20 years, the taboo on open discussion of all aspects of 1971 in Croatia would also be violated. It is from that standpoint that one should view Gotovac's book, which deals with one of those aspects—the fate of a writer who had gone astray in a party court.

The articles in the book appeared over the period of the last 20 years. The first part, "Outsider Fragments," was printed in the Zagreb journal KRITIKA in 1969 and 1970. These essays pondering the relationship of intellectuals and the authorities still seem relevant when read today, while on the other hand, the sincere content of the text documents the sensibilities and positions of the "lost generation," the people associated with KRUGOVI at that time.

The second part of the book, entitled "My Case," consists of Gotovac's defense at his court trial in 1981, a letter to the managing board of the Croatian Philosophical Society, and an interview with Dimitrije Rupel, all published in the Ljubljana magazine NOVA REVIIA in January 1988. The final essay, "Dead Stake," is being published in Zagreb's FORUM.

Vlado Gotovac began to write for Zagreb's KRUGOVI, and to date has published 16 books of poems, criticism,

and essays. As the chief editor, he signed about 20 issues of HRVATSKI TJEDNIK, which was published from March to December 1971 in Zagreb. For his editorial work and his writing in the newspaper, he was sentenced by the Zagreb District Court under Article 100 of the Yugoslav Criminal Code to 4 years at hard labor and a 3-year ban on appearing in public, because he "committed the criminal act against the people through a counterrevolutionary attack against the state and the social order." After conversations with foreign journalists in 1981, he was sentenced again to 2 years in prison, not at hard labor, and a 4-year ban on appearing in public, because he had "maliciously and falsely portrayed the social situation in the country."

In a country whose entire intellectual public, regardless of its internal differences, has been bitterly speaking out in recent years against the existence of the verbal crime in the criminal code, Gotovac's just published case of a verbal crime has special significance. The book's editor, Slavko Goldstein, says in the preface: "I carefully read all seven of Gotovac's articles for which he was declared guilty and convicted. It is understandable that the explanation of the verdict recounts and comments on those articles, but it nowhere quotes them verbatim. There is simply nothing to cite in the sense of an indictment. There is not a single sentence against self-management or socialism, against Yugoslavia as a federal state, or against the Serbs or any other people. There are many dramatic warnings and activist calls for Croatia to win its statehood and equality within Yugoslavia, to liberate itself from the various guilt complexes being forced upon it, and to commence a renewal that will bring it more political freedom, economic independence, and national self-confidence."

Even at the promotion of Gotovac's book, where the author himself spoke, in addition to editors Goldstein and Bozo Kovacevic, along with critics Predrag Matvejevic and Bruno Popovic, several consequences of the ending of "his case" could be sensed. For the author himself, it was a reappearance in public, and an opportunity to tell the public what was actually involved here from his standpoint, after years of writing phantom (unpublished) letters and revisions, in the manner of Prof Herzog. For editor and cultural activist Goldstein, it was one more argument against the political state "in which things are administered according to the criteria of the political party in power, and where public political activity can subsequently be declared a criminal act.... A law-governed state protects its citizens from such politocratic arbitrariness."

For critic Matvejevic, and probably for many others as well, it was an opportunity to disagree with Vlado Gotovac for the first time, without the connotations of the Criminal Code—to disagree with his views of language policy, and with the attacks on the journal PRAXIS (which "promote intolerance," Matvejevic says), to speak and write critically about Gotovac's poetry and ontological essays, and, if they thought so, to make calm attacks on Gotovac's anti-anthropocentrism

and his holistic world outlook. In short, if we may quote the already banalized Voltaire, as Matvejevic did in his review: "I am against what Gotovac said in several places, but one should fight with all one's strength to ensure that he can say it."

[Box, p 43]

Vlado Gotovac: Rather Stupid Games

[DANAS] Back in the spring, when your literary contribution finally came out in DANAS, after almost 20 years, your name was left out of the newspaper notice about the magazine. Today your book is coming out, and you are giving statements to journalists....

[Gotovac] In all circumstances I am only interested in one thing: our freeing ourselves from the longstanding practice that has prevailed in Croatia of easily condemning and eliminating people from public life. I am profoundly convinced that in the past Croatia has been the worse in this respect. Even now, however, an attempt is being made to return to that status, because what is happening today with Knin demonstrates a return to the practice of settling things by force when they cannot be settled politically. The problem in Knin is not Knin's problem at all, or Opacic's problem: He only found himself in the maelstrom of a political event in which he himself did not play a major role. And instead of our politics settling that issue, and finally raising the issue of Serbs in Croatia, so that the Serbs themselves in Croatia would decide what they want completely, because that is their right, because we have to support that right, because we must all secure that right for them—thus, instead of all that, it resorted to force. If the Serbs (in Croatia) want to have Cyrillic, and they want to have their own schools, their own societies, that is their right. Neither I nor they know what kind of consequences that will have for their public life. They have the right to try it, however. I personally think that all this business about the Cyrillic and Latin scripts is a rather stupid game; for 40 years after the war the Serbs almost all wrote in the Latin script, and did not lose any of their Serbian identity, as we can see. All of that has been contrived in a way that is tasteless—in terms of the intellectual inferiority of these problems, and the inability to have them formulated properly, and put in the real context of the modern world. We can raise the question of writing in the destiny of a people, but it is a big question, technically, philosophically, and linguistically, and it is necessary to sit down and talk seriously about it. But if DUGA, which is published in the Latin alphabet, tells me that Serbs without Cyrillic lose their identity, that is comical. I read articles by some of my colleagues, and it is a scandal. It is no longer a question of orientation, but rather of stupidities mixed with an inferior intellectual system and very often with ignorance. In that atmosphere, thought is impossible, because the moment that a person gives up concern for the truth, he also gives up thought. We cannot talk in an atmosphere in which facts, science, and the status of the modern civilized world are

denied. The terminology "two eyes" does not suit the 20th century; who in the world will you tell that we have two eyes?

What I want to say is that we have reached a situation in which the most normal and most serious things have become the subject of an ignorant, uneducated, culturally irresponsible, politically bold-faced, and thoroughly manipulated propaganda conflict. I do not want to participate in such a battle, nor do I accept its conditions, nor do I believe that anything can come out of it except what has always come out of such battles throughout history. That is a disaster. It is a degradation of man and an abandonment of those values which are being "defended" through this. What is being done by many Serbian writers is a blow against Serbian literature and Serbian culture; it is a degradation of the stylistic, linguistic, and other values which Serbian literature has achieved, just as the spiritual horizon of this is the total betrayal of the greatest works which that culture has achieved. What lies behind those positions is nothingness, and not Serbian culture.

[DANAS] You spoke about Jovan Opacic, who cannot be overlooked today. Part of the official reflections on the "Opacic case" can be reduced to the criticism that in Croatia, Croatian nationalists are the ones who are defending Opacic, because that case is also opening up room for them to act.

[Gotovac] That is the discovery of the so-called Croatian balance. In Croatia the principle has always been that if you attack one group, you must also attack the other. If you lock up one group, you also have to lock up the other. The only thing from that principle that has been abandoned is the traditional policy according to which any disagreement with the official policy on national issues has led to their ultimately being proclaimed Ustase. Now people are getting even with many leaders for that, because now they are being proclaimed Ustase as well. Through the repressive use of those terms, the leadership in Croatia used to try to pacify people who did not need to be pacified and were not even threatening them. A community conceived in that manner, in which some people will be pariahs and others will live as free people, cannot exist in Yugoslavia. It cannot exist in Europe either. In an interview in PARIS MATCH, Glucksman recently said, "If Germany is a pariah, then Europe is also a pariah." That is incontrovertible.

No one in Croatia can mislead public opinion with his political and national demands. We are both intellectually and morally capable of resolving them in the sphere to which they belong: by political and cultural means. That should be allowed, and I am profoundly convinced that then all issues will be properly resolved.

[DANAS] For 20 years you have been said to be a "Croatian nationalist," and you also spent 6 years in prison....

[Gotovac] I wrote a pile of letters that no one ever answered. Today a journalist, Djordje Licina, sat down

here; I signed a book for him, because I did not hold a grudge, even though he wrote against me without the facts. At home I have a pile of letters that dealt only with the facts that the court established, i.e., not any kind of subjective standpoint, which the court did not accept. They have never been published.

[DANAS] What did you think in 1971, and what do you think today, about the accusation of "misreading," about your being responsible, as chief editor of HRVATSKI TJEDNIK, for certain responses among parts of your readership, which reached 130,000 copies before the magazine was abolished?

[Gotovac] There is no text whose scope, by any analysis whatsoever, can extend to its extreme consequences. Modern criticism, which has almost overgrown art and become more important than it, has had to stop before this. We see the perspective of any text and statement, one's own or another's, only to a certain degree and no further. Being intelligent after 50 years, only in one way, is a pure deception. You can be intelligent at the moment when it happens. After 50 years it is possible to identify a mistake, along with the perspective from which it was made, and to identify why the mistake was inevitable. The situation in our country has changed in the sense of allowing something to happen, but it is not a turning point for people, ideology, or belief. We have people who have changed their views, but in doing so they have not changed themselves even a little. Verbal changes do not convince me of anything. That is why anything is still possible in our country. That is why people say that "anything is possible": not only in the sense of Lebanization, but also in the sense of an inflexible, rigid, repressive, and archaic totalitarianism.

Rejection of Dialogue By Kosovo Intellectuals Scored

90EB0073A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
9 Oct 89 p 7

[Article by Z. Zejneli: "Discussion Rejected in Kosovo"; first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] Individual Kosovo intellectuals who have been very vocal because all dialogue with them is allegedly rejected simply do not show up when called on to participate in discussion of an important topic. At the same time, however, they talk willingly in Slovenia and Croatia.

Pristina, October. For more than a year now Albanian nationalists and separatists have been alleging throughout Yugoslavia a conflict between the intelligentsia of the Albanian ethnic minority and the League of Communists.

Voices of individuals have become louder of late, but not in Kosovo. They allege that intellectuals in Kosovo are persecuted, even though there is no valid reason for it.

They insist on open discussion and dialogue, but when invited they refuse to come and talk, and they offer no explanation for their refusal.

This happened at a roundtable discussion recently held on the subject of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] in the struggle for new interethnic relations.

The 50 persons invited to participate included university professors Ekrem Murtezai, Ramus Mavrici, Esat Stavileci, and Skelzen Malici. They did not come, however, even though the persons in question are Kosovo intellectuals who advocate dialogue and who criticize the League of Communists whenever the occasion arises for them to do so. They could have done all this at the roundtable in Pristina, but they did not come, possibly because they did not want to face the truth, which does not suit them. They have their own truth about the events in Kosovo, which they willingly hawk in Slovenia or Croatia. These same intellectuals readily accept all discussions offered them in these areas.

Their absence could be interpreted as their decision to remain silent in Kosovo and Serbia.

Several years ago Dr Ekrem Murtezai was punished by a party fine for opportunism and lack of commitment, but this did not prevent the Municipal Committee and the Marxist Center in Pristina from inviting him to the roundtable. Dialogue was also avoided by university professors Dr Ramus Mavrici and Dr Esat Stavileci, who also have not as yet spoken up about the events in Kosovo and who avoided dialogue on this occasion. Only they know if it was because they were afraid of something or simply because they did not want to take part in a discussion with persons who hold different views on the Kosovo situation. Nevertheless, it is a fact that they were provided an opportunity, if they have opposing interpretations and viewpoints, to present them in a public forum.

It is also obvious that philosopher Skelzen Malici, who after coming to Pristina from Belgrade gave an interview about Kosovo and in connection with the events there, did not want to talk. His views changed very rapidly, and he, like many intellectuals in Kosovo, has joined those who would rather remain silent in Kosovo, probably to give the impression that no one wants to engage them in dialogue.

By refusing to take part in the discussion they simply demonstrated that they are not for the dialogue which they openly advocate. Their lack of response to a subject such as interethnic relations may thus be interpreted as an attempt to demonstrate to the Yugoslav public, the public in the North, and the world public that no dialogue is desired with Kosovo intellectuals of the Albanian ethnic minority, that they are merely persecuted and punished, and that they are victims of politics in which there is no place for them.

The reality is obviously different. The League of Communists wants dialogue, but apparently some intellectuals do not want to talk to the League of Communists.

Salary of FEC President Markovic Discussed

*90EB0073B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
11 Oct 89 p 1*

[Article by R. N.: "Man at the Top, Pay at the Bottom"]

[Text] According to reliable sources, Ante Markovic's most recent pay was 2.3 billion old dinar, about 550 dollars at the current rate of exchange.

Markovic's personal income (it certainly is not profit) became the central subject of public interest after he prevented its being revealed on the TV program "Dialogues" a week ago. When a viewer asked how much he is paid, he replied "I am ashamed to admit how little it is," while yesterday's issue of BORBA stated (in the context of questions not dealt with on the program) that, when asked if he is paid 1,000 dollars, he replied that he is not.

Not only does the FEC [Federal Executive Council] president not receive 1,000 dollars; he gets only around 550 dollars at the current rate of exchange. For purposes of comparison, we point out that this is half the average pay in the Federal Republic of Germany. For this amount of money the prime minister cannot buy even two Murin suits, and a television set would be a major investment. Just how much such a pay level motivates him to do the work expected of him is a separate question.

Of course, many persons will view this figure not only from the viewpoint of socialist realism but also from that of the self-management wage levelling system, which prescribes that the earnings gap between "the director and the cleaning woman" may be 500 percent and not 1 percentage point higher. Even so, it may be said that Markovic more or less conforms to this formula. After all, is it not entirely normal for blue collar workers to earn 100 dollars a month if the premier gets 550?

Many people remember Markovic's statement at the very beginning of his term of office to the effect that FEC members must receive high wages. How otherwise is it possible to keep, let alone attract, highly competent specialists in a business which, we may add, works under the most difficult conditions of any Yugoslav government that has ever existed. After all, for years now the brain drain from federal institutions has been a problem precisely because of pay; people have been leaving for better paying (and less responsible) positions in industry (where wages last month were up to 10 billion old dinar) or in an agency at the lower republic level. The FEC president has not reached this goal; pay rises more slowly in the FEC than average wages around the country.

It is absolutely certain that the majority of the impoverished population will say that even this amount which Markovic is paid is too much, and that an honest premier and an honest government must share the fate of ordinary citizens. The marketplace logic of "I will pay you as much as you are worth" simply has not yet crossed the threshold of our awareness. And it might be said that we have not yet asked ourselves the question of who, since his only goal is not power (in our circumstances it is an illusion of power), would do this job for this pay?

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Gradual Implementation of State Enterprise Law Viewed

90EC0087C Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
11 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by Marie Konigova: "Chamber of People of CSSR Federal Assembly Debates Gradual Implementation of State Enterprise Law"]

[Text] Prague (from our correspondent)—At an independent session on Tuesday in Prague, Chamber of People deputies discussed the implementation of the state enterprise law and its impact on the fulfillment of national economic tasks. These discussions are one of the ways that the Federal Assembly is carrying out its controlling function for society. The deputies stated that concrete measures need to be taken now to make the implementation of the law more complete, to foster the development of socialist entrepreneurship, to help achieve high quality, efficiency, and technical sophistication in production, and to facilitate rational behavior and business transactions. The state enterprises that have already been established, and the elections of their directors and self-governing offices are just the beginning.

Based on this law some 2,246 state enterprises have been founded in the CSSR in a relatively short time. The groundwork has been laid for the two level management of the national economy. Preparations for organizational changes in the production base were made responsibly, as Vladimir Vedra, chairman of the Chamber of People, noted in his report on the issues involved in implementing the state enterprise law. As research conducted by 37 deputies has shown, the principles outlined in the government resolution covering the foundations and procedures for the organizational restructuring of the production-technological, R&D, and distribution base of the national economy to accommodate state enterprises were not followed to the letter in the first phase. Those who established state enterprises have not taken full advantage, when reorganizing the enterprise sphere, of possibilities for eliminating the high level of undesirable monopolization in our economy. Nor have they paid enough attention to laying the foundation for essential future structural changes.

V. Vedra pointed out that opinions on the election of directors differ. Reservations concerning the principle of electing directors have been expressed mainly in enterprises with a large number of employees, or in firms whose operations are distributed to various parts of the republic. Others pointed out the administrative and organizational difficulty of holding elections, as well as their costliness. We have made too little use of competitive management in our selection of candidates. Experience has shown that we need to pay more attention to the political and personnel aspects of director elections.

The existence of a work collective council is a new, very significant element in enterprise operations. Members of

these councils have for the most part been selected because of their professional and political qualifications. These councils include factory directors or other managers of internal enterprise units. V. Vedra noted that this may result in undesirable, two-track management, the council on one side, enterprise management on the other. Vedra added that even though the law makes provision for these councils and states their function, some of the councils are still looking for their place.

Initial experiences with the state enterprise law have led to several proposed changes. Chamber deputies have expressed these in committee meetings. A major topic of discussion has been whether or not to repeal the provision for electing enterprise directors. More time is needed to evaluate this proposal. V. Vedra stated that at present it is not felt that there is a need to modify the law.

Research conducted by deputies has also indicated which measures related to improving the quality of internal enterprise management and introducing internal enterprise cost accounting have been adopted in which locations. Here as well, there clearly are enterprises that recognize the need to prepare themselves for a new environment, as well as those which continue to mark time, waiting for directives from above or for additional, so-called restructuring laws (see page 2 for an excerpt from one speech).

Bohumil Urban, first vice chairman of the CSSR Government, addressed these issues on behalf of the government. He informed session participants that delays in drafting the law had been eliminated and that everything is ready for a general introduction of the restructuring principles on 1 January of next year.

B. Urban stated that our goal must be the gradual opening of our economy to the world so that world markets and prices exert a greater influence on the behavior of our firms, eventually becoming the main criteria of their success. In this regard, our wholesale prices are still out of line with world trends. It is essential that we gradually correct this deformation.

With regard to a wages policy, B. Urban stated that changes are being drafted. Three forms of wages will be recommended. The form or forms to be used will be negotiated between the founder and the enterprise. An updated law on work force management is also being prepared.

The national economic planning law has brought changes that will mean the end of hidden capacities and the struggle for lower plan targets.

The government has mandated a certain amount of obligatory negotiation of supplier-customer relationships. Even so, the contract signing process is often accompanied by tactical maneuvering, delaying tactics, waiting to see what will be obligatory and what will be optional. Producers are requesting foreign currency participation from their customers.

The management of the economy will be a regular part of the state plan. This will involve management through prices, interest rates, loans, subsidies, and exchange rates. The regulations are already in place. Work is under way on new regulations covering financial and economic mechanisms for foreign trade, on ways to activate the customs system, on a long range program to reduce subsidies, on decrees related to social service consumption by enterprises and cultural and social needs funds, and on granting permission to engage in foreign trade activities. The Federal Government has also evaluated the status of work on the position and role of a unified center. This work is based on the assumption that the fundamental role of a national economic center is to formulate major development objectives and a unified investment, financial, credit, currency, exchange rate, and wages policy to support these objectives (see page 2 for a excerpt from his speech).

Fifteen deputies took part in the discussion, excerpts of which appear in several places in this edition. The deputies are Zdenek Ceska, Jozef Belko, Bretislav Benda, Frantisek Kliha, Dobromila Vavrova, Milan Kubat, Stanislav Janda, Ludek Kapitola, Josef Kryl, Alexander Madarasz, Jaroslav Matousek, Jan Zelenka, Stefania Michalkova, Florian Kubinsky, and Michal Soltes.

After the discussion representatives of the Federal Government responded to the questions that had been raised.

Bohumil Urban responded to V. Vedra's question regarding the profitability of all state enterprises in the first half of 1989. Urban stated that the performance of 612 state enterprises had been analyzed. Initial price restructuring objectives had called for 4.5 percent profitability. The actual result was 1.5 points higher. The results were, however, widely dispersed, from minus 18 percent to plus 34 percent profitability. In some cases these differences are price related and have nothing to do with enterprise operations. In practice this means that one group of enterprises will have a shortfall in financial resources of roughly Kcs 44 billion, while another group will have a surplus of about Kcs 98 billion. Many enterprises have noted that the new wholesale prices are contrary to their interests and the structural changes they are implementing. B. Urban stated that wholesale price levels will be adjusted as of 1 January 1990 in response to these complaints.

Deputy Josef Kryl asked about the motivation of employees related to resolutions concerning wage management. B. Urban responded that the fundamental link between wages and economic incentives for collectives to improve performance will remain. The link will not be a simple one to gross output, but will be targeted rather to efficiency. Bonuses will increase in 1990 to 10 percent of total wage volume. Naturally, the relationship between these incentives and earnings will be differentiated. We are working on a formula that will result in a different relationship of incentives to wages for people

who make decisions that will have an impact in two or three years than the relationship that applies to an employee on the production floor.

Frantisek Kliha asked what is being done to overcome shortcomings in technical development, innovative activities and product quality. Karel Julis, vice chairman of the CSSR Government, and chairman the State Commission for Technical and Investment Development responded to this question. Julis stated that this year the CSSR People's Control Commission had inspected the quality of State Plan output parameters. Some 130 research projects were evaluated and it became clear that we need to reduce the number of orders that do not yield state of the art results and which do not provide an effective return on the resources allocated to them. Resources should be concentrated on fields that are significant for the restructuring of the Czechoslovak economy. The objective is to put the money designated for R&D at the disposal of the requestor of the project, that is the production enterprise.

The resolution adopted by the Chamber of People deputies after their discussions stated that despite the short time that the state enterprise law has been in effect, its provisions are being implemented. State enterprise operations have not yet had an impact on fulfilling qualitative state plan indicators, however, because all of the conditions for their operation have not yet been put in place. Some founders are not really interested in resolving existing problems in the enterprise sphere, and thus retain outmoded administrative techniques and procedures. Social organizations, especially the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement [ROH] and enterprise self-administration offices are still searching for their proper place and function.

The Chamber of People therefore recommended that the CSSR Government systematically establish foundations for implementing the state enterprise law. The government should also monitor the activities of founders and, when enough experience has been accumulated, evaluate their success in creating the conditions to support strategic work at their enterprises and the ongoing improvement of managerial performance. The government should direct their activities towards clarifying structural changes, developing downsizing and consolidation programs, and on carrying out tasks of a national character. The Chamber of People recommended that the government improve the qualifications of managerial personnel at state enterprises, so they can better implement the new management principles.

The deputies also recommended that state enterprise managers work closely with ROH organizations and self-administrative offices to organize active employee participation in fully implementing both the state enterprise law and internal enterprise cost accounting. They called the attention of managers to the carrying out of social policy and expanding employee participation in management.

This day long discussion was attended by Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, Alois Indra, chairman of the CSSR Federal Assembly, and Ladislav Adamec, chairman of the Federal Government.

Increase in Private Service Permits Urged

90EC0087B Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
4 Oct 89 p 1

[Unattributed editorial: "More Assertive in Services"]

[Text] Services. Their sophistication, availability, and quality are one of the measurements of the work of a national committee. Citizens rightly criticize persistent shortcomings in this area. It is well known that more than 50 percent of all people procure services elsewhere than through organizations or individuals with permits to perform them. This finding from a public opinion survey, along with citizen complaints, led to a search for a new way to deliver services.

The restructuring of national committee activities allows a choice to be made regarding the most effective way to deliver services in a given location. Economic reform gives national committees the right to establish state enterprises, the mission of which is to meet citizen needs for services. Regional and district national committees have used this right differently. The CSSR Government had approved the establishment of 732 state enterprises as of 1 July of this year. Almost 50 percent of them are managed by national committees. The largest number have been set up by district and city national committees in the West Slovak region. Some 64 state enterprises engaged in local production and services have begun operating there. In the CSR [Czech Socialist Republic] the largest number, 36, has been established in the Central Bohemian region. This has involved more than the splitting up of existing district service enterprises. New organizations have appeared, such as construction firms for specialized jobs in Hradec Kralove, Univa in Blansko, Kompas in Boskovice, and others. These firms represent a strengthening of the economic base of these cities. These organizations are much more capable of reacting to local needs. This was the stated objective in the formation of a city enterprise in Rumburk na Decinsku, to perform not only services, but also housing maintenance and other work.

Setting up state enterprises is only the first step. As their founders, national committees must not only make delivery of services the main objective of these firms, they should also use economic tools to offer incentives and evaluate this work.

If this is not the case, the establishment of state enterprises for local services turns into a search for profits, with the needs of people getting short shrift. This should also be kept in mind regarding the operations contributory and budgeted service organizations administered by national committees. District kombinats supported by district national committee budgets will continue to exist

as an organizational form. It is true for them as well that entrepreneurship and flexibility have a large impact on citizen satisfaction.

Another form for the delivery of services are national committee workshops. The terms small factory or supplementary form are no longer appropriate. Mainly in villages, national committee workshops are becoming the single and exclusive form for delivering services. They are no longer supplementary. In fact, their size comes close to that of an enterprise in some instances. For instance, the local national committee of the central village of Bukovany na Sokolovsku operates a workshop with almost 100 employees, many of them technicians. It is considering becoming a state enterprise. The local national committee of Velky Tynec na Haj in Silesia has already established a state enterprise which has made a contribution to providing services in villages. New regulations for the management of state enterprises for local production and services employing few people, which were approved on 8 July 1989 by the CSSR Government, provides a good foundation for this. The regulations for firms employing up to 100, and in some cases 200 employees, for instance, reduce administrative requirements by 70 percent. During planning the firm submits to its founder one form instead of the 20 currently required. Accounting, reporting requirements, and the like are also simpler. The purpose is to reduce paperwork, leaving more time and people for performing work.

Measures adopted related to restructuring the economic mechanism in services, domestic business, and public eating establishments seek to eliminate existing shortcomings. These problems include a tendency to prefer production over services, the high administrative cost of managing services, as well as high overhead costs.

These costs are minimized in the case of a national committee workshop that offers a broad range of services. These services can range from bricklaying to providing transportation, the small scale sale of building materials to tailoring and other services.

In all, local production and service enterprises and national committee workshops have more than 400,000 employees. This is not a small work force, but the output of these organizations still does not meet the needs. Enterprise and factory managers as well as national committee functionaries today need more entrepreneurial spirit, the courage to look for new, nontraditional activities.

Fears persist, for instance, with regard to putting factories in the economic control of citizens. At the same time services controlled this way, just as those provided by citizens authorized to do so by the national committee, are often delivered more quickly, are more available and effective for the general public.

CSR government ordinance No 1 of 1988, and a similar ordinance passed by the SSR [Slovak Socialist Republic] government provided significant impetus for an increase

in the number of permits for individuals. The number of permits has increased by more than a factor of three since 1982. In the CSR, for instance, national committees have issued more than 40,000. The most frequent permits are for custom production and repair of textile products. The Mlada Boleslav district has had positive experiences with such permits. Citizens also perform repairs and maintenance of metal products, machinery, and electrotechnical products. Another area where many permits have been issued is for construction, geological, and design activities. There is still a shortage of masons, heating specialists, and installers. In view of new measures offering incentives to build family homes, these trades will be in still greater demand. The existing tax structure, however, does not offer incentives to individuals to perform too much of their licensed activity. This, combined with the lax attitude of national committees to moonlighting, has resulted in increased moonlighting activities. The total output of people with permits reached roughly Kcs 300 million two years ago. In contrast, those engaged in moonlighting and others performed work and services valued at Kcs seven billion. We cannot close our eyes to this fact. Rather we should create a tax system to deal with the situation at the level of central state offices and national committees.

It is the responsibility of national committees to figure out ways to expand the delivery of services, just as it is the responsibility of National Front social organizations not to be afraid of new organizational forms. An assertive and flexible approach can only have a positive impact in that it will generate new resources for the development of towns and villages. Mainly, however, this attention will result in increased service quality, and therefore in greater citizen satisfaction.

Inability to Reduce Steel Production Criticized

90EC0087A Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
18 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by Evzen Stanek: "Are We Reducing Steel Production?"]

[Text] Czechoslovakia has one of the highest per capita iron and steel production levels in the world. Despite the fact that this has been criticized for years as one of the factors holding back the national economy and lowering its efficiency, production last year exceeded the record of 15.5 million tons. This figure will not decline this year either. Why have we been unable to reduce steel production, despite all past plans, and why have we not been able to improve production efficiency? Readers of RUDE PRAVO often ask these questions in their letters.

Worldwide Trends

Before attempting to answer this question let us first take a look at the factors leading to reduced steel production and increased production efficiency in the industrially advanced countries of Western Europe. In the early 1970s total production had declined in these countries to 16.219 million tons. Statistics show that one third of the

savings came from modernizing the mills, mainly by introducing continuous casting technologies. This significantly reduced waste during steel production, reduced necessary inputs, and improved the efficiency of the process. The oil crisis played a role here, because it raised fears of energy shortages.

Other savings were realized by reducing customer requirements for steel. This came from producing labor-intensive products and reduced amounts of metals, made possible by using new materials. Other reductions came from the use of state-of-the-art machinery and equipment by steel consumers, and changes in the internal structure of their production.

The fact that Third World countries entered the market for metallurgical products on a much larger scale than before also contributed to reductions in domestic metallurgical output in the industrial countries. Finally the significant amount of, mainly, rolled materials that these countries purchased from us meant that they could reduce domestic production by an equivalent amount.

Closed System

The developmental strategy of our industry did not take sufficient account of the fact that the reduced volume of metallurgical production in the advanced countries is mainly the result of reduced consumption of these products in other sectors. The consuming sectors in the Czechoslovak economy failed to modernize, and instead ordered more and more metal. A comparison, the so-called obvious consumption of steel in our country of some 700 kilograms per capita annually is one of the highest in the world. The per capita figure for the FRG is less than two thirds of the above figure. An abrupt reduction in metallurgical output to a point below the level to which customers could adapt would, however, bring about shortages that would disrupt economic equilibrium. It would both disrupt supplier-customer relationships and worsen market imbalances. A unilateral, less than fully informed decision would clearly have a negative impact on future development of the economic mechanism. It would strengthen the monopoly position of steel producers and would force us to ration steel distribution.

Reduced production, in other words, goes hand in hand with reduced consumption. The latter in turn is impossible without further modernization and restructuring in the machine building industry. The entire industry must learn to build higher quality products using less metal.

The same relationship exists for another frequently discussed topic, the export of rolled steel to foreign customers. In 1988 alone we exported more than three million tons. There are several reasons why exports in the past year have not declined. One of the reasons is that exports to the Soviet Union for the Eighth 5-Year Plan were increased by 300,000 tons annually in conjunction with long term projects and contracts. The strategy formulated this year for economic and R&D cooperation over the next 15-20 years calls for gradual

reductions in steel exports from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, exports of metallurgical materials have been further increased both to China, as a result of our improved relations, and to nonsocialist countries in order to improve our balance of payments. Increased prices of rolled materials on the markets of nonsocialist countries also contributed to this decision. The fundamental reason, however, is the failure of other industrial sectors, especially machine building, to export sufficient quantities of state-of-the-art products. For this reason the fully specified plan for metallurgical workers calls for increased production of rolled materials. The original proposals by the industry to reduce production of these materials had been criticized by the State Planning Commission as not ambitious enough.

A third, also significant reason for the increasing production of steel is that the very production of ferrous metals creates a demand for those metals. Out of total domestic steel consumption of more than nine million tons in 1985, the mills themselves accounted for more than two million tons. Some of this is accounted for by waste caused by obsolete production techniques, and some is caused by the modernization of old facilities and the construction of new ones, such as lines for rolled materials.

The mills have also been modernized, but this has involved expansion in most cases, the addition of new facilities. This has resulted in a situation where modern plants exist right next to obsolete facilities. We currently produce more than 100 tons of iron and steel annually per employee in the metallurgical sector. The figure for the FRG is larger by a factor of two, and in other advanced countries, such as Japan, labor productivity is several times as great. For practical purposes the costs involved in modernizing all facilities would be prohibitive. Closing down the obsolete plants immediately, while the most efficient solution, is not feasible for the reasons noted above.

The main way to break out of this circle of high domestic consumption and low production efficiency is to achieve consumption savings in other sectors, in conjunction with the introduction of continuous casting, refining outside the furnace, and other conservation technologies. Together this will allow us to close obsolete facilities.

Opinions on Modernization

The Federal Ministry of Metallurgy, Machine Building, and Electrotechnology recently drafted a long term strategy for the development of the metallurgical industry within the entire economy. It contains two basic variants for the potential development of our metallurgical sector. The first, thought to be the most realistic, calls for a reduction in steel production by the year 2005 to a level of 11.5 million tons annually. The work force would decrease by 30,000 employees, and 90 percent of the steel would be produced using continuous casting.

The environmental impact would be significant. From current levels of 78,000 tons emissions would decline to 37,500 tons, and the amount of released sulfites should be at 50 percent of current levels by 1995.

This modernization would require about Kcs 20 billion in each subsequent 5-year plan. It is estimated that the metallurgical industry could earn up to Kcs 15 billion of that amount. Success in implementing this variant would allow us to avoid sharp social fluctuations in this area, at the price of a slower increase in labor productivity. In the year 2005 projected productivity would only be 70 percent of current levels in the FRG. The second variant calls for a reduction to 10 million tons of annual output. This would result in the loss of some 40,000 jobs, which would have to be replaced in other industries or in the metallurgical industry itself. This variant would result in labor productivity in the year 2005 on a par with current levels in the FRG. Some experts even assert future work on long range planning may yield variants more favorable for the national economy, in which the steel mills would not only generate the resources for their own downsizing and development, but also to contribute to the modernization of other sectors.

The outlines of these proposals have been presented here as an example of current thinking on the development of this critical sector. Whatever the decision of the central offices, consumers must expect economic pressures in the future to expand their product lines and profitability while consuming less iron and steel. In spite of all the difficulties, problems, and past decisions, metallurgical production cannot stand alone, and in the future will have to be at levels that correspond to national economic needs. These optimal levels will be determined both by the new structure and by industry efficiency. In the final analysis the most important thing is not how many tons of iron and steel we produce but how efficiently we produce them and what we do with them.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Economic System Weaknesses Critiqued

90EG0036A West Berlin *DER TAGESSPIEGEL*
(WELTSPIEGEL supplement) in German
15 Oct 89 p 1

[Interview with Dr Gernot Schneider, economist, by Ute Reinhart, a freelance journalist in West Berlin: "Nothing Will Change Without Sacrifices"; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are *DER TAGESSPIEGEL* introduction]

[Text] Until 1982, economist Gernot Schneider trained management personnel of GDR industry in East Berlin. But when he wrote critical theses on the GDR's economic situation—meant only for internal discussion—he was confronted with two alternatives—either retract them or lose his job. He lost his job. After 2 years he came to West Berlin and now works at the University of Cologne.

In his book "GDR Economic Miracle—Claim and Reality" he studies the quality of life of people in the GDR through examples from the sectors of "housing," "environment," "work," and "private consumption." The quality of life is highlighted in particular by the fact that life expectancy in the GDR is 2 years below that in the FRG, although there had been no difference in that regard in 1960.

The crisis of legitimization of real existing socialism is evident, not only by the mass flights of past weeks, but also by the reaction of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] leadership to any criticism. The page-and-a-half-long response in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND to my [Reinhart's] article "The Administered Crisis" in early August was a first indication of the necessity to counter the growing discontent among the populace. But the way of dealing with this discontent, the gulf between doctrinaire ideology and daily experience, could only create new discontent.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] Mr Schneider, from official declarations one could gain the impression that the GDR economy is flourishing. How do you explain the discrepancy between West German and East German assessments of the economic situation?

[Schneider] In this matter, the GDR response to your article, for example, actually does strike one as somewhat spooky. If I am not mistaken, the answer came from Prof Claus Kroemke, the personal adviser of Guenter Mittag, the SED Politburo member responsible for economic affairs, and Dr Dieter Brueckner, deputy editor in chief of "ND" [NEUES DEUTSCHLAND]. The oversimplifications in the two authors' argumentation, which lags far behind the published problem awareness and state of discussion in GDR science, indicates a need for justification in domestic policy. The SED leadership still hopes, at least temporarily, to be able to evade serious reforms. Moving the SED Party Congress forward by 1 year to May 1990 is an indication of that. By this action one is freed of the traditional task of thoroughly discussing and critically evaluating the past 5-year plan and its economic results.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] So you believe that the SED leadership also assesses the economic situation as do Western observers?

[Schneider] Actually, it is the other way around. Only the SED leadership involved knows precisely the real economic situation of the GDR, at least to the extent in which an overall economic overview can be compiled. For reasons of power politics it conceals this knowledge from the public. Western observers can only approach the economic reality of the GDR through "long-distance reconnaissance."

[TAGESSPIEGEL] How then, in this context, must one evaluate the claim that the growth rate of the GDR's national income is higher than that of Western industrial countries?

[Schneider] It is virtually impossible to compare the produced national income of the GDR with the Western national product, both represent very different values, since neither GDR production performance nor production structure are subject to international competition. If it were different, the environmentally ruinous brown coal industry, for instance, would hardly have a right to exist. But this very industry contributes significantly to the national income. Due to brown coal mining, in the past 3 decades some 750 villages (!), 130 km of railroad tracks, 210 km of highways, and 70 km of waterways were moved, affecting the national income. In addition, growth also results from removal of environmental damage caused by the burning of brown coal: in emission of sulfur dioxides, the GDR holds the absolute first place in Europe per capita and square miles.

And finally: While computation of the Western national product is based on the performance achieved by the entire national economy, the GDR national income expresses only the production result. Totally ignored is whether this production performance can be sold at all, and if so, at what prices. Thus the 120-percent growth rate of the national income produced in the period 1970-87 is confronted by an 80-percent increase of domestic consumption. Or even more up-to-date: The almost 35-percent growth rate between 1980 and 1987 was faced with a 15-percent increase in domestic consumption. Evidently, foreign countries paid lower prices for GDR products than those on which the computation of national income is based. This demonstrates the difference between paper accounting and reality. How much ultimately remains unsaleable even in the domestic market can be judged only by the few select who share in the power of exclusive knowledge. But internal GDR discussion, particularly in recent times, is dealing very critically and in a very differentiated manner with the weaknesses of this performance index.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] What do you mean by "power of exclusive knowledge"?

[Schneider] A great amount of economic data, which in the West is available to the public, is treated in the GDR as a state secret or confidential classified information. I am thinking, for instance, of the balance on current accounts, the lack of data on the GDR's foreign trade balance of 1977-79, the gaps in the proof of use of funds in national budget accounting, incomplete data on the labor force (arms industry, bismuth, etc.), the "total societal performance" index approximating our national product accounting; this index has been computed internally in the GDR since 1986.

A strict hierarchical order regulates access to this economic information which must not be published and can only be passed on for official business, and only to those with "secret" clearance.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] The GDR leadership claims to operate "the economy not for its own sake," but to "ever better satisfy the constantly growing needs of the

people." This is where the primacy of policy over economy comes into play, whereby policy determines the focal points of social and economic policy. Housing construction policy and price stability are cited as the heart of this policy.

[Schneider] Without a doubt, the GDR has made great efforts in the field of housing construction policy since 1970. But the goal of solving the housing issue as a social problem by 1990 will not be reached, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively, although the resident population had declined by more than 400,000 inhabitants since 1973. As Honecker himself admitted, 14 percent of all apartments will have neither a bathtub nor a shower even after 1990, and 21 percent will not have indoor plumbing. Just as a comparison: Here, 1.7 percent of all apartments do not have indoor plumbing. Even after 1990, about half of all apartments will not have a modern heating system; neither compulsory state management of housing nor the freeze on establishing residency in certain areas of concentration will be abolished. In future, also, only independent households have a claim to an apartment, which excludes single persons, and second apartments remain prohibited.

In the GDR, on the average 27 square meters of living space per person are available; here it is 36 square meters. Since the small apartments no longer correspond to international standards, the GDR furniture industry was forced to design special furniture for these apartments. Furthermore, new GDR housing construction so far made tight living space available in mostly depressing satellite towns, although GDR scientists have been demanding for a long time that the different housing needs of people be dealt with on a more individual basis.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] Does the saying still hold true, "better have 10 teeth pulled than move to Marzahn?" [A German pun on "Zahn" = tooth, and "ziehen" = to pull, and to move.]

[Schneider] This mocking remark describes the complete contradiction of the housing construction policy through the example of a new housing area which was only completed in 1987. With 60,000 apartments and one indoor swimming pool to date for more than 200,000 inhabitants, the population density of this township exceeds by more than one-third the statistical GDR average. This creates tensions and stresses which directly contradict the social claim of new housing construction.

The almost synchronous daily rhythm of the predominantly working populace with children causes extreme situations in overcrowded elevators, public means of transportation, shopping centers in residential areas, and kindergartens. Furthermore, the oversupply of architectural monotony has a depressing effect. In addition, one comes across colleagues from work everywhere, so one "keeps an eye on each other" even after work, because factories are assigned their new housing contingent primarily by apartment blocks. In short: Marzahn as a

bedroom town at best solves the problem of lodgings, but not the housing issue as a social problem.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] Recently, a play in the GDR was allowed to say something to this effect: "Formerly, my grandfather said 'our plant' when he went to work; today it is our plant, but no one calls it that anymore."

[Schneider] Formerly workers identified with "their" enterprise, first because it gave them work and bread, and also because, together with their trade unions, they had fought for their factory-specific working and living conditions. Today, with guaranteed job security, the field of tension between work and private life is missing: for one thing, the feeling is missing that one's own work performance actually secures one's livelihood even if only indirectly, through the existence of the enterprise, and for another, the feeling [is missing] that this certain work place is also "earned" by one's own personal performance.

In addition, working conditions today lag far behind the employees' wishes. Standard weekly working hours of 43.75 hours remain at the level of 1967 for more than 73 percent of all employed salary and wage earners. GDR trade unions still demand that shift work be increased more purposefully, although the percentage of industrial workers on a 3-shift schedule has increased from 17 percent in 1970 to 25 percent in 1986. Among young female production workers, half of them work several shifts, often even at night. If one takes into account legal holidays and vacation time as well as the standard target working hours, then employed salary and wage earners in the GDR work approximately 300 hours more per year than do their colleagues here.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] A woman refugee recently said that the only thing that is not scarce is work. How does the GDR cope with the loss of so many young, well-trained workers?

[Schneider] According to official GDR statistics, everything is in apple-pie order! The number of employed rose by 100,000 between 1984 and 1988, although 150,000 people emigrated during the same period. If the GDR leadership lets 100,000 citizens emigrate this year, and please note, the majority of them arrive with a validated emigration application, it [the leadership] must have given some thought to how to make up for it, or must at least be convinced that it can be made up.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] The GDR is particularly proud of the price stability for basic foodstuffs. A loaf of bread today costs exactly the same as 30 years ago. But this policy becomes absurd when, in the course of other price increases, bread is fed to animals because fodder is more expensive!

[Schneider] Subsidized prices are a social as well as economic anachronism. First of all, the need for subsidies grows constantly; in the case of food, for instance, it rose from 7.8 billion in 1980 to 32 billion in 1988;

secondly, it leads to waste as your example also demonstrates, and thirdly, it is not suitable for social policy measures because these prices benefit all levels of the population.

These prices also are not a tax gift by the state, but require the highest prices for other goods as a counter-weight so that the populace itself pays for the subsidies. But the policy of high prices for all other goods disadvantages above all pensioners and low-income groups.

This problematic situation is also recognized in the GDR. For example, a publication this year points to the "connection between the price of water and the degree of its use, also the degree of its being wasted." Thus the price of water for private households is 50 percent below production cost. This has brought about that the GDR today is a country with very high per capita water consumption. Resultant negative effects on the environment are inevitable: even now there are problems of providing sufficient drinking water in certain regions.

In addition, price subsidies block efforts for a "common market" and "convertibility" in CEMA because, even in the judgment of GDR experts, this requires a largely uniform price level among the partner states. At present, at least, the GDR is moving in exactly the opposite direction. In 1988 it issued more stringent export restrictions in the noncommercial goods traffic vis-a-vis East bloc visitors in order to protect the "interests of GDR citizens."

[TAGESSPIEGEL] With industrial pricing it was attempted to at least partially restore a control function to prices.

[Schneider] Yes. For years, there has been lively discussion among GDR scientists about industrial pricing, also. There is the complaint that the demand for cost-covering prices causes predominantly lasting price increases. The forming of combines favored tendencies toward monopolization of production and hence the creation of cost oases, since there is hardly any more competition. Attempts to counter this system-endemic price increase by basing pricing on international prices instead of national costs resulted in contradictions between signals of scarcity from the outside and the preferences of the planning authority with regard to the goods sector.

An acute lack of goods and other reasons stripped prices of any control function. How else can one explain, for instance, that petroleum prices, which rose by almost 800 percent in the GDR between 1976 and 1986, did not bring about the process of substitution with brown coal, as intended by the political leadership? Instead, the political leadership has to fall back on prohibitions of use, rationing, and other commodity regulations.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] Reforms have gone on in the GDR since 1971. Several times you have mentioned critical discussions among GDR scientists. Where do they see the greatest problems?

[Schneider] In the GDR there is often talk about a "chronicle of reforms and changes," as if reforms presented a value per se. But all these efforts make sense only if they help improve the competitive position of the GDR economy and the populace profits by them. And that is precisely the problem: Ever more GDR scientists are becoming aware of the defects of their economic order, for example, with regard to the indices of performance rating, the destruction of the environment and waste of resources, pricing, the lack of innovative dynamism, the system of motivation and incentives, the lack of a freely convertible currency, the dammed-up inflation because of the lack of goods for private as well as productive consumption. But they are allowed to seek solutions only within the system of state central planning. Since its "reform reserves" are largely exhausted, one predominantly stops with marginal proposals of change.

Furthermore, GDR scientists point out the problems connected with the planning process. In order to set up in advance economic plans relating to money and goods for a plan period, one must calculate with unchanged planned prices in this plan period. But since the price-effective technical progress does not stand still in the plan-implementation process, the occurrence of temporary non-agreement of performance proofs relating to money and goods is inevitable on all planning levels.

Planning means to assess, regulate, systematize. But economic processes are influenced by imponderables, coincidences and spontaneity. Hence once a plan is worked out, it may very quickly become worthless and require plan changes which destroy its original "inner logic." It became known that in 1986, a construction combine had to cope with a total of 23 amendments to the yearly plan.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] How much longer can the GDR leadership go on without reforms?

[Schneider] Reforms cannot be brought about by talk. The time must be ripe. Hysteria is not called for. If the analysis is correct that one can no longer meet global and world economic challenges with the means of centralistic and national economic planning, then it remains a question of political insight (some also call it pain threshold) when the GDR will start the transformation process. The present efforts in Poland and Hungary probably do not yet create a need for action.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] And the Soviet Union?

[Schneider] Looking purely at the economic aspect—something may be moving politically, but that is difficult to judge at the moment—I see no need for action. But if the Soviet Union were to demand—as in the case of Hungary at her own request, probably as early as 1990—offsetting the mutual trade in dollars, then this would naturally create a different situation for the GDR.

[TAGESSPIEGEL] Should the West make its influence felt?

[Schneider] The West promotes this process of political insight most effectively by staunchly developing further its own economic dynamism. There is no alternative, for the East's willingness to reform can only be understood as a reaction to the dynamic processes in the West.

At the same time, we should be ready to support the GDR's efforts if the GDR signals its will to transform. But there must be no doubt that these transformations during the initial phase will demand great sacrifices from all concerned. Overturning the present economic principles of order in the GDR, and stepping out of domestic economic isolation and sometimes perhaps "safety," can succeed only through a national tour de force. For example, the wish to be paid in freely convertible currency in order to enjoy the pleasures of freedom of consumption is incompatible with the demand for state-guaranteed jobs. Everyone must know the risks and opportunities of a new economic order, and be willing to confront them. Before turning to the actual transformation processes, first a political consensus on these basic issues should be established in society.

Economy Critiqued in SED's Main Organ

90EG0045A East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 3 Nov 89 p 4

[Article by Prof Dr Wolfgang Heinrichs, director of the Central Institute for Economic Sciences, and Wolfram Krause: "Economic Reform—Element of the Renewal of Socialism"]

[Text] Economic questions are rightfully also at the center of the renewal of socialism, the implementation of a turnaround policy initiated at the Ninth meeting of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee. An effective economic system is indispensable for the functioning of our society's political system, as in turn the further democratization of all its sectors is a condition for a new quality of socialist economic activity.

Many problems of the economy are raised in discussion contributions by working people who, as societal owners and value-creating producers, are concerned with how in the future, also, the performance development of the economy remains inseparably tied to social progress for all of our country's people. All levels of economic management are confronted with a multitude of tasks, for the accumulated problems require expert and detailed knowledge, directed to the search for realistic steps and measures to keep our country's economy stable and lead it out of contradictions. Economic scientists are both in demand and willing to develop new, pioneering solutions for this cardinal question of the shaping of socialist life. From knowledge of the economic foundations of the power of the people, they have begun to critically analyze what has been achieved and to measure it objectively against the demands of the present and the future. Initial constructive beginnings of solutions exist and should be brought ever more strongly into public debate.

Careful consideration of variants also requires a broad, constructive dispute of opinions and calculations—and not only on the central level, but on all levels of our economic management and in people's parliamentary representations. Economy, policy, and democracy postulate each other ever more intensively. The shaping of these reciprocal relations will decisively co-define our image of socialism, of a renewed socialism.

In the current hot debates, many issues of the economy are discussed openly and critically: defects in implementing the performance principle, disproportionate development of ancillary suppliers, supply gaps on the domestic market and too-low foreign currency revenues on foreign markets, insufficient flexibility in the management and planning system, etc. Seen in context, they concern the overall organism, "national economy." The question arises as to the function of all its "body parts," the effective circulation of its bloodstream. Evidently a great deal of new blood is needed—to stay with this image—in order to make economically and socially more effective the economic reproduction process in all its elements, from production to distribution and circulation to consumption, including its foreign trade interlinkages and ecological requisites.

The development of society, as understood by dialectical materialism, here obviously concerns a need for renewal which can only be adequately satisfied through a comprehensive economic reform.

Economic reform—that, also, is a consequence of our understanding of the nature of the social system—occupies a central position in the overall concept of renewal of our society. It is in inseparable interaction with the expansion and reshaping of socialism's political system. We should not fear contacts with the concept of reform in the economic area. We have had such development phases in the past, and we shall continue to need them. Even more so today, and less halfheartedly than before. The necessity for it is concrete. There are clearcut requisites and necessities—and even worrisome occasions. Outmoded structures and management procedures slow down the growth dynamism and development of effectiveness, lower the effect of driving forces in social policy and limit self-responsibility of economic units and fields.

Economic reform to be directed at unlocking these brakes needs thorough conceptual work.

On what should it be based so that it can be implemented in a solid, well-founded, daring, and yet circumspect fashion?

First of all, it requires a thorough analysis of the actual economic situation of our national economy. Studies by various institutions exist, also by the Academy of Sciences' Central Institute for Economic Science. They show:

—The unity of economic and social policy since the beginning of the 1970's made possible a continuous

and dynamic development of the national economy and permitted the GDR to expand its leading economic position among CEMA countries.

- At the same time the effectiveness dynamism suffered a considerable decrease in the second half of the 1980's. Economic growth in part was carried out by using sources [needed to] secure the future, i.e., at the cost of high attrition in many sectors of the material-technical base, at the expense of international competitiveness in important export products, [and] at the risk of environmental conditions.
- Lags in technological and productivity standards compared to leading capitalist countries have not diminished.
- The structure of the economic end product (investment, consumer and export goods) is not sufficiently demand-oriented and in part shows considerable disproportions. They appear as deficits in one place, and as unnecessary inventory buildup in another place of the economic cycle, as well as increasing discontinuity of production.
- Constantly ensuring the GDR's solvency necessitates ever higher export volumes which limit the national income available for domestic distribution.

One can establish a general common denominator for the analysis of many economic scientists: The GDR, in satisfying the important basic needs of people (ensuring full employment, food, clothing, housing, education, health care, etc.), achieved relatively high social standards compared to its economic capacity. A two-thirds society, massive housing shortage, long-term permanent unemployment, reduction of social rights which confront rich capitalist industrial countries—all that is unknown to our society because of its very socialist nature. This must be preserved and further expanded, despite all renewals needed here. That, however—and this must be stressed in all seriousness—requires a considerably faster pace of scientific-technical renewal and a decidedly higher level of productivity and effectiveness in the 1990's than in the past decade.

In addition to analysis, conceptual proposals regarding economic reform must also be based on a scientific foundation, on the recognition and utilization of economic precepts according to their objective nature. There was little of that in recent times in certain economic policy decisions, particularly when and where economic decisions of social import were prepared and made. Actually, subjectivist decisions and orders by "individuals at headquarters" were more and more superimposed upon economic reason in the work on finding the best solutions. Critical voices sometimes were not taken seriously, or even ignored from a know-it-all position. But well-founded decisions can be made only if the realistic view of economic facts is not covered up by a statistical plenitude of numbers. Statistical data must be accessible data of thorough economic analyses. The comparison of plan and actuality does not constitute

an analysis. The value, or lack thereof, of economic processes, results and facts must be measured against criteria derived from economic precepts. That can be neither tons nor sums of goods production, nor do reported numbers of net production alone suffice for it. Social use and economic capacity are expressed in particular by criteria such as:

- the ratio of expenditure and result which pays much greater attention to the ratio between domestic expenditure and export revenues, because otherwise social development could be detached from international performance criteria;
- the degree of actual coverage of demand according to volume, assortment, and at the required time;
- the performance achieved in relation to working hours used in production;
- the technological condition of the entire material-technical base measured against international standards, and
- many other items.

Conceptualization of an economic reform must also be based on the realization that the reproduction process must be shaped in its entirety as a process of material and financial circulation. Renewals in the economic system must create economic elbow room in order to promote the material processes in the direction of greater effectiveness and more end product available for distribution. They must also prevent the initiation of processes for which no material conditions of implementation exist, or which cannot be created yet, respectively. Halfhearted measures and inconsistencies are an example in the implementation of the principle of self-financing. What good does it do if even today financial means can be set aside in the combines, but their material implementation is not yet settled; if a backlog of investment needs is covered by funds, but not by material possibilities of implementation.

Similar symptoms can be noted in the structural processes to create proportionality between total commodities available and purchasing power on the domestic market. They are all a source of inflationary symptoms which up to now were ignored by official economic policy.

Lastly, it would be the task of an economic reform to link changes of the economic mechanism at the bottom, in the producing units and areas, inseparably with changes in the functioning at the central government level. In this field in particular the greatest halfhearted measures occurred so far, even slowing-down effects of efforts—which can actually be rated positively—to increase self-responsibility of economic units and areas. Although rights were delegated to general managers and council chairmen, regulations were retained for centralizing decisions in the form of an overly large system of indices and reporting, including a strongly centralized accounting system. In our opinion, there is still too much hesitation in deciding the issue of what should and can be delegated by central management to the lower levels

regarding self-responsibility. As a rule, the decision is made in favor of centralization because the idea is still prevalent that only the central authority indiscriminately is the most suitable level for all economic processes to implement societal interests most purposefully. Is that really so? This point must be discussed both critically and responsibly. It also includes the expansion of trade union democracy in plants and institutions.

For this reason and from the premises mentioned, we see economic reform, to be conceptualized for our concrete conditions, to be broader than it is predominantly understood even in international discussion. It comprises economic strategy, the determination of goals and criteria of economic and social development as well as fundamental changes in the economic mechanism, i.e., management, planning, and economic accounting itself.

On this basis economic reform, which we need now, would have to concentrate on the following major tasks:

—Stabilization and shaping of the material proportions, of the production and export structure, which better correspond to changed and further changing conditions of demand on the world markets and the domestic market. The central economic issue surely is not the computation of global growth rates, but precise detailed work in order to direct resources to those products and technologies which achieve the greatest possible foreign trade revenues, supply the economy with productive equipment, ancillary supplies and means of rationalization, and provide the domestic market with more and better technical consumer goods for the populace.

—Redefinition of the priorities of social policy which allow implementation of the interaction between performances for society and performances by society as an effective driving force for productive labor and desirable quality of life.

In purposeful implementation of the performance principle, the development of direct earned income and society's allocation should be brought into direct correlation to increase labor productivity and earning profits. The development of real income must be coupled with stabilization of the supply of a wide assortment of consumer goods and services, in particular technical necessities of high quality and justified prices. Subsidies, also, should be provided in such a way that they can be applied in a more differentiated manner and do not stimulate the waste of resources. This applies equally to continuing the housing construction policy, in which preservation of existing housing and construction of housing within cities are greatly gaining in importance.

—Shaping real possibilities for economic entities in order to decisively increase the pace, expansion and level of scientific-technical innovations. This necessitates stimulative regulations within the framework of self-financing as well as the creation of effective working conditions for researchers and developers, radical elimination of bureaucratic regulations, and

the creation of leeway for creativity in science and technology. The linkage of product development, technologies and investment activity must be handled more firmly.

—Renewal of the system of management and planning, which should gradually be based more and more on the transition to normative steering of economic processes. The striving for high net profits must be developed much more purposefully so that it is in the interest of the enterprise and of society. For this a functioning market mechanism is indispensable, based on the effect of the law of value and pricing in particular, which makes possible a true measuring of expenditure and benefit. What are needed are economically equivalent relations between producers and consumers, suppliers and buyers, relations in which the monopolized producer does not unilaterally dictate conditions to the buyer and consumer. This requires greater flexibility for the consumer goods retail trade and for the wholesale trade of production means. Above all, it also demands expansion of the operating sphere of monetary, financial, and credit relations.

Some exaggerations in the formation of combines, to produce more and more through one's own construction, must be rethought, as well as even more differentiated utilization of all forms of ownership.

—Lastly, the dynamic development of the economy also requires even more effective integration into international socialist and world-economic division of labor through utilization of modern forms of cooperation. It must be emphasized that all our analyses confirm that foreign trade stability decisively influences the total structure of our country's economic and social policy.

Thus economic reform must contribute to implement intensification even more comprehensively, to use all material resources more economically, to use our economic labor capacity more efficiently, and to deal responsibly with the environment. The type of reproduction process needed for renewal of socialism must aim at purposeful economy of resources and be ecology-minded.

Many steps and measures will make economic reform a reality. They must be set up for the long term and serve the shaping of the future. But they must be directed just as reasonably to the immediate Today and Tomorrow. Hence economic reform must take into account existing realities, the achievements of our economy as well as its difficulties and the present, very limited material leeways. Illusions about quick results in higher effectiveness, more end products for distribution and more foreign currency are just as misplaced as persisting in present conditions.

Thus the immediate concern is drawing up a balance-sheet plan for the year 1990 in order to achieve, with what is available, further production performances which advance those social developments which have

already been decided upon and initiated. Dialogue needs an ongoing, largely stable process of production and supply.

At the same time, medium- and long-term steps of economic reform are to be drawn up which must be tied to the next 5-year plan and also linked to the one after that. New and so far unfamiliar tasks will confront the economic-scientific potential in the GDR. It will be worthwhile tackling them, because they are needed.

Implementation of economic reform will not take place without risks and tensions. Hence the question is justified: What is to be risked, what must we risk in the interest of renewal of socialism? We must solve the braking effect of routine and dispense with preconceived notions, [we must] draw on collective knowledge which is created in fruitful discussions about various types of solutions, which grows and ripens into decision.

Neither old nor new know-it-alls are called for.

Now the best knowledge of all is called for.

Schoenberg Landfill Among Europe's 'Most Modern'

90EG0040B Rostock OSTSEE-ZEITUNG in German
28-29 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Volker Penne: "A Heavy Mortgage for Our Children"]

[Text] One of the most modern landfills in Europe has been in existence for almost exactly 10 years. It is almost a playground for the Western media and representatives of that guild have often literally stood amid the piles of refuse in the hopes of perhaps yet bringing to light a hidden ecological time bomb—without success. Now, right at its 10th anniversary, representatives of the press, radio, and television of our Bezirk got the opportunity to participate in a press excursion. To tell the truth, I have seldom been so excited about a visit and I hope that in the future my colleagues and I will get to experience this kind of fidgety anticipation more often and will not have to wait 10 years for it.

The Barkas van we are sitting in outside the work entrance seems like a dwarf compared to the enormous transport vehicles waiting at the checkpoint. During the week some 150 to 200 of these "Brummis"—fully loaded, mainly with household waste—are registered here each day by the computer at the two 80-ton scales. These are orders of magnitude that give an inkling of what the landfill's director, Rudolf Kenner, subsequently explains and shows us in actual practice. Using comprehensive expert studies, the head of the landfill is able to make precise statements about all the geological characteristics of the site, which consists of 164 hectares in all. From 1978 to 1980 the geologic strata in an area 20 km in circumference from the refuse mound were studied with the most exacting precision by specialists. Similar

analyses were undertaken by Federal Republic of Germany. Studies of the construction site revealed a boulder clay subsoil to a depth of 290 meters. It was further discovered that there was no aquifer in the test area. "There are no differences of opinion among the experts in East and West concerning the favorable geological-hydrologic conditions in this area," says Rudolf Kenner.

We were able to see for ourselves the trouble his 165 employees go to to ensure—that through requisite technological preparation of the sections of the landfill—that pollution of the ground or surface water cannot occur. Surprising to the layman, this truncated pyramid, slowly growing in height, seems like a large-scale construction site. At present, a surface area of 10 hectares—that corresponds to the area of about 13 soccer fields—is being prepared. For the people at Schoenberg, that means that approximately 400,000 cubic meters of soil must be moved. In the process, 110,000 cubic meters will be used on this area alone for sealing against mineral seepage. Through the use of the vibration rolling technique—colossal monster-machines move over the landscape here—subsoil sealing is accomplished. In the soil and waste laboratory located on the premises chemists monitor the permeability readings in these layers and record the results of the analyses. Difficult for the observer to comprehend and yet a fact, the waste is literally packaged. A 2.5-mm thick foil is laid with great precision on the subsoil by a specialty company from the Federal Republic (40-50 employees work constantly at the site). The 10-meter-wide and 100- to 120-meter-long rolls are bonded together by heat treatment and are x-rayed to determine their thickness. Eng Rudolf Kenner comments: "It has been determined by analysis under severe laboratory conditions (this maximum stress occurs only extremely rarely in practice), that the foil we buy on the international market will remain durable for several hundred years. The certificates of quality are available."

A 30-cm-thick layer of gravel is spread on the shiny black foil before household waste is placed on the surface. Drainage pipes that catch surface and ground water and divert it to a storage reservoir are laid on these layers. This project can be pictured as a kind of supereaves-trough in which the watery element is caught. Annually, about 50,000 cubic meters—which are not simply dumped into the discharge channel as is usual in many landfills—are handled by this circulation system. The most modern technology was purchased abroad for this and at present an additional ground water installation is being built for a total of 40 million East German marks. Water which has been purified in five filter stages and has attained quality standard 2 or 1 (standard 1 corresponds to that of ordinary drinking water) is finally released into the discharge channel. Freight trains laden with many tons of household waste arrive and create a kind of cushion (this "bed" is 5 meters thick) onto which the special waste is added. To our question what specifically was meant by this came the following response: sludge, excavated industrial waste, and industrial and

paint residues. Although this dump, set up in a technologically optimum manner, would also be suited for the storage of toxic waste, that kind of special waste is not deposited here. Thus, the depositing of toxic, dioxin-containing, liquid, or radioactive waste, for example, is forbidden. We wanted to see for ourselves. We were taken directly to the laboratory whose technical equipment had already truly amazed many a guest and which is located at the landfill site.

Before a vehicle may enter the area of the mound with special waste which is allowed here, a qualification test is conducted in the laboratory. The two chemists and five laboratory assistants have very good laboratory equipment at their disposal for this purpose. The pH value, oil and water content, biodegradability potential, conductivity, and heavy metal content can be precisely determined in a few minutes. Important above all in the case of spadable sludge: The moisture content may not amount to more than 65 percent (otherwise the mound's solidity would be in danger). If discrepancies are present, an in-depth examination is immediately undertaken. Thanks to Japanese hi-tech (one device costs 120,000 West German marks), chemist Wolfgang Mueller can determine in a split-second the concentration of chemical compounds. He also shows us the available documentation regarding the weekly analyses which are compiled by every client in the Bezirk. Over 50 readings are recorded which very clearly show the percentage of iron, copper, tin, phenols, and manganese in the loads which have been delivered. In each case, the laboratory test is done twice. Although not usual in international practice, as Rudolf Kenner tells us, in the GDR chemists of Intercontrol Incorporated in Wismar test yet again the "donations" for the mound. Certainly an expensive safety measure (in 1988 alone the landfill paid 2.5 million East German marks for these additional tests), but nothing can be too expensive for safety.

But rejections, which mean an immediate return of the vehicle to the company of origin and cost the responsible party in the area of 25,000 West German marks, are not very frequent. Wolfgang Mueller shows us a delivery certificate (these are issued here in 12 copies) from which it is evident that the percentage of solvents in the paint residues delivered 3 days ago from a Bremen paint shop was too high. Ergo: return. In addition to these previously-described testing mechanisms, laboratories in the Federal Republic are also included in the process. Thus, among others, a soil laboratory in Luebeck provides us with precise data on the condition of the enormous landfill. Multiple laboratory samples, technology of the greatest precision for analysis, substantial measures for the protection of the environment and the broadening of safety standards that are also prescribed by the EC—these are facts which experts from East and West have high regard for. Recently included among these is Prof Dr Berndt Heydemann, minister for Natural Resources, Environment, and Land Development of the FRG Land of Schleswig-Holstein, who characterized the Schoenberg landfill as being very well protected and able to hold its

own in comparison with standards he is familiar with for landfills in Europe. By the way: Any visitor can see for himself not only this visit, but also the appearance of the Netherlands' environmental minister on the video tape which is played in the visitors' room of the social building on the site.

Rumors and claims have been heard repeatedly in the past that the GDR would become a gigantic garbage bin for Western waste and that Schoenberg represented the leading edge of this development. The fact is, is that annually about 1 million tons of refuse of a precisely defined nature that has been generated by modern civilization is deposited there (since 1979 a 15-member monitoring group from the most diverse fields of expertise, whose staff members range from the Department of Geology and the Office of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection to the GDR's highest mining authority, has been in existence there). By way of comparison: In the Federal Republic of Germany alone approximately 800 kg of household refuse per West German citizen is generated annually. The total amount of material being stored at Schoenberg consists of the following: some 800,000 tons of residential waste and 30,000 tons of special waste—such as the already-mentioned industrial residues, excavated industrial waste, and paint residues. At present, the largest amounts arrive from the Hamburg/Schleswig-Holstein area, but only 50 percent of the residential waste generated in Grevesmuehlen Kreis is brought here.

Despite the most modern technology and its proven harmless nature, this artificial mountain is controversial among the residents of Schoenberg. On the one hand the landfill represents a considerable encroachment on the setting of the landscape, and on the other hand the problems with local waste are growing. One of Europe's most modern landfills right in front of our own door, as it were, and what do we do with our own trash? Investigations conducted in cooperation with delegates preparatory to the last Bezirk congress, which was devoted to environmental protection issues, illustrate the problematic nature of this. Due to a lack of landfill areas—in Bad Doberan Kreis, for example—the municipal authorities are being forced to improvise. Happy is he who has a bulldozer and simply "moves" the rubbish. The proper geological tests have often not been made at many existing landfills. Several meters of dirt apparently cover the trash but do not eliminate the problem. These dump sites are a heavy mortgage for our children. Opening a new, systematic landfill costs millions of marks. But why are we filling up every available hole in the Bezirk when there is a safe storage area at hand? Plans have already been made for the Schoenberg landfill to the year 2003. Then there will still be a quarter of its capacity left so that the mound will have attained its precalculated height in approximately the year 2030. And there is not supposed to be room for our waste?

To be sure, this service installation—as has been customary internationally for a long time—is a good source

of foreign exchange. But at what cost? Will our descendants have to pay for this? "Transport vehicles are needed in order to be able to serve at least the western Kreise of the coastal Bezirk in this same manner as quickly as possible. We do not have these at our disposal. Yes, we will be happy if our Bezirk gets some Liaz-Bobr (special vehicles from the CSSR)," says the council member responsible for the Bezirk council's Regional Public Utilities Department, Gerhard Godewols. Left to its own devices, the Bezirk has been overburdened for years and decisions on the part of the government are needed. We expect a practical answer from the minister for Bezirk Managed Industry.

P.S. To all those who believe that there are surely still some secrets somewhere in Schoenberg I can only say that in recent years hundreds of citizens from both sides of the border have taken tours of this gigantic site and boss Rudolf Kenner continues to be more than willing to show interested citizens his realm on the spot. Prior registration is recommended since the landfill is located in the restricted area. Now Schoenberg is not, cannot, and should not become a tourist attraction because the works director and his team still have to do their work too, but I consider the opportunity to obtain verification to be enormously important.

Officials Describe Air Pollution Detection Methods

*90EG0040A Rostock OSTSEE-ZEITUNG in German
28-29 Oct 89 p 2*

[Article by Dr Rolf Bartonek: "Call for More Openness in Environmental Policy"]

[Text] How clean is the air that we breathe every day? What effect does air pollution have on our natural environment? Questions that more and more people are anxiously asking themselves all over the world. The answer begins with measuring, and this proves to be more difficult than it appears at first glance. For substances have to be recorded in the tiniest admixtures, in as many locations as possible, and at brief intervals. And a similarly large number of changes which the pollutants undergo while being carried through the air must be recorded.

Every day 100 stations in the GDR report the air pollution readings they have recorded to the Meteorological Service. The number of these monitoring stations has increased by tenfold since the early 1980's. Today the GDR possesses a network of such stations that extends throughout its territory and thus compares well internationally in this area. Less satisfactory in the GDR, however, is the situation in regard to the equipping of these stations with modern measuring and automation technology. The deputy director of the Meteorological Service and director of the Central Weather Service Office, Dr Manfred Reiber, and the chief of the Research Department, Dr Jochen Kluge, point this out. Nonetheless, a solution for taking readings which is both economical and scientifically relevant has been found.

What this is, is the involvement of the Meteorological Service in the collection of data on air pollutants—something which is not usual internationally. For the meteorologists, this means adding the study of atmospheric chemistry to that of atmospheric physics. Nearly one-half of the 100 measuring stations belong to the Meteorological Service, while the others are subordinate to Bezirk health inspection offices.

When it comes to air pollutants, it is well known that sulfur dioxide is the main problem for the GDR, while in other countries nitrogen dioxides play a greater role. Measurements have proven that pollution with sulfur dioxide has been reduced only slightly during the past years on a global scale, while clearly measurable improvements have been achieved locally—through the expansion of long-distance heating, for example. In 1987 the GDR recorded the emission of 4,990,000 tons of sulfur dioxide and 955,000 tons of nitrogen dioxide. The reason for the high level of sulfur is that power production in the GDR is based extensively on soft coal. Apart from any preferences in this regard, this situation cannot be altered for quite some time. But, says Dr Kluge: "I generally advocate more openness in environmental policy. And one of the issues which must be publicly discussed involves a pricing policy which is harmful to the environment. With subsidized prices we are promoting high energy use in households and hence the emission of sulfur dioxide, for example. This ought to be discussed publicly." Dr Reiber adds: "Protecting the environment, and particularly lowering the emission of sulfur dioxide, costs a lot of money. If we spend more money on that, of course it will not be available elsewhere, including the social services area. Only in public discussions can the people be persuaded to show the necessary understanding for that."

In cooperation with the Center for Environmental Engineering, a "sulfur dissemination model" was developed. It is based on the numerical solution of a differential equation which specialists have termed the pollutant dissemination equation. In addition to the levels of emission, the horizontal and vertical distribution of the pollutants caused by the wind is included in the calculation—especially important in instances of long-range propagation. Turbulent intermixing of the particles, which is responsible for the diffusion of the substances in directions other than exclusively along the direction of the wind, is taken into account. And finally, the calculation provides information on chemical changes as a result of the interaction of the pollutants with each other and with the water in the atmosphere. Sulfuric acid and sulfates are created in this way. The meteorologic conditions also go into the equation.

The GDR's "sulfur dissemination model" is the only model which is used internationally to calculate the diffusion of pollutants on a day-by-day basis. With it, the GDR can precisely determine what amounts of sulfur originating from its territory are conveyed to which areas of the country as well as across its borders. The centers

operating in Moscow and Oslo under the terms of the European Evaluation and Monitoring Agreement (EMEP) only monitor pollutant flows cumulatively and over longer periods of time. "Today we are further advanced than the current wishes of potential customers require us to be," says Dr Kluge, "because we

can provide scientifically-based predictions of pollution in individual regions." As yet, there are no customers for the "pollution eather report"—apparently because there is no "pollution umbrella" either. The best protection doubtlessly consists of lowering emissions and a more frugal use of energy.

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